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FROM RIGHTS TO DIGNITY:
DRAWING LESSONS FROM AID IN DYING AND REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS
Yvonne Lindgren*
Abstract
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court identified the abortion right as
“inherently, and primarily, a medical decision” to be decided between
doctors and their patients. Early abortion case law closely linked the right
to the doctor-patient relationship and situated abortion within the context
of healthcare. Over the last forty years, however, the abortion right has
come to be viewed almost exclusively as a constitutional right of decisionmaking or “choice.” Under the Court’s current analysis, the abortion
right is cabined exclusively as a constitutional right to decide to terminate
a pregnancy and, as a result, the Court has upheld significant restrictions
on access to abortion-related healthcare.
The aid in dying (AID) movement has experienced the opposite
trajectory between framings of healthcare and a constitutional right of
decision-making. Originally identified as a “right to die” by advocates
such as Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the movement has since transitioned to a
right framed as healthcare. Dr. Timothy Quill’s call for “death with
dignity” helped to reframe the AID movement from a narrow focus on
decision-making at death to transforming the process of dying more
generally. The transition to death with dignity coincided with an expanded
public discourse about how poverty, disability, social and family support,
and healthcare access impact end-of-life decision-making. At the same
time, the goals of the movement expanded from court-won rights to
*
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changing healthcare practices, and increasing healthcare access, legal
rights and social support for people facing the end of life.
It is a critical time to study and draw lessons from these two
movements as they accelerate in opposite directions: Last year, pro-AID
legislation was pending in twenty-five states, passed in California, and
cases were filed in California and New York. The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments this term in a Texas case on regulatory restrictions of
abortion clinics. Further, more state abortion restrictions were enacted
between 2011 and 2013 than in the entire previous decade. While other
scholarship has compared AID and the abortion right to consider their
doctrinal, moral and ethical similarities, this Article is the first to identify
that these two movements arc in opposite directions between framings of
healthcare and rights, with vastly different efficacy for the rights holder.
I draw upon this comparison to consider how the history and discursive
development of these two movements offers the possibility of framing
healthcare more broadly within the context of dignity to achieve social
justice goals beyond narrow constitutional rights status.
The transformation of AID from a constitutional rights frame to a
healthcare frame highlights the importance of developing a healthcare
model related to dignity that is undergirded by social support, legal rights
and healthcare access. However, the history of the abortion right cautions
against narrowly identifying healthcare within the confines of the
individual doctor-patient relationship because it risks subordinating the
decisional autonomy of patients to the decision-making of their doctors.
Taken together, these movements gesture toward situating rights within a
healthcare framing that considers how social, political and economic
systems and relationships come to bear upon decision-making. I conclude
that while constitutional rights status is important for anchoring a
minimum protection of the right of patient decisional autonomy, a
healthcare-as-dignity frame brings with it the possibility of addressing
underlying conditions that deprive individuals of meaningful choice in
these contexts.
INTRODUCTION
The current “death with dignity” framing of aid in dying (AID)1 belies its early
“right to die” origins that were marked by heated public conflict over morality,
1

The term “aid in dying” has recently replaced the commonly used term “assisted
suicide” to refer to a terminally ill competent patient’s decision to seek a physician’s help in
prescribing medication to hasten the dying process. See David Orentlicher et al., The
Changing Legal Climate for Physician Aid in Dying, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1961, 1961–62
(2014); Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Promise of Glucksberg’s
Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1594–95 (2008)
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ethics, and “life” similar to those that are ongoing in the reproductive rights arena,
and primarily the abortion right. The early movement for AID was personified by
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a pathologist who claimed to have assisted more than one
hundred individuals to terminate their lives. Dr. Kevorkian did not have ongoing
doctor-patient relationships with the people he helped to die; rather, he
conceptualized his help as a service to strangers in their quest to end their lives.2 Dr.
Kevorkian’s work is illustrative of the early framing of AID as an individual’s right
of decision-making that was uncoupled from the context of healthcare. In this same
period, the AID movement sought court recognition of a constitutional right to
choose to terminate one’s life with the help of a physician.
It was Dr. Timothy Quill who first called for “death with dignity” in his article
by the same name,3 and in so doing began the process of reframing the right to die
from a constitutional rights claim to an issue of healthcare.4 After the Supreme
Court’s rejection of a right of AID in Washington v. Glucksberg,5 the AID movement
evolved from a focus on constitutional rights claims into one that included broader
healthcare goals that sought to enhance the legal rights and healthcare access of
people at the end of life. Thus, what began as a focus on decision-making at death
transitioned into a movement to transform the process of dying more generally by
increasing the social support, healthcare access, and legal rights of people in the
dying process.6
(noting the important evolution in terminology from “suicide” to describe the choice of a
mentally competent, terminally ill person to choose death); Judith Gordon, New WSPA
Policy on Value-Neutral Language Regarding End-of-Life Choices, (Jan. 8, 2007),
http://www.wapsych.org/resource/resmgr/Docs/New_WSPA_Policy_on_Value-Ne.docx
(2007) [https://perma.cc/DU73-H7WT]; infra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
2
HOWARD BALL, AT LIBERTY TO DIE: THE BATTLE FOR DEATH WITH DIGNITY IN
AMERICA 68–69 (2012).
3
Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case for Individualized Decision Making,
324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 691–94 (1991). Others have been equally instrumental in shifting
the way dignity is understood in the dying process. For example, Elizabeth Kubler-Ross is
considered to be the mother of the hospice movement in the United States and an influential
thinker on the care for the dying.
4
Professor Robert Schwartz persuasively made this argument in a lecture entitled How
Physician Aid in Dying Became a Medical, Not a Legal, Issue presented at the UCSF/UC
Hastings Consortium on Law, Science and Health Policy on August 28, 2012.
5
521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).
6
At the same time, the movement continued to push for the legal rights to AID at the
state level. In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court recognized the right of terminally ill
competent patients to AID by drawing upon the “dignity” language in its state constitution.
See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213 (Mont. 2009). In recent years, AID has experienced
trending successes, with five states legalizing aid in dying: Oregon and Washington by public
referendum, Vermont and California through legislation, and Montana through judicial
decision. A case is currently pending in the New Mexico Supreme Court. Morris v.
Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Jan. 31, 2014), rev’d, 356 P.3d
564 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015), cert. granted, 369 P.3d 369 (N.M. Aug. 31, 2015) (No. 35,478).
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By contrast, the abortion right has experienced the opposite trajectory between
framings as a constitutional right of decision-making and a right of healthcare. The
abortion right was originally identified by the Roe v. Wade Court as “inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision” to be decided between doctors and their patients.7
Over the last forty years, however, the abortion right has come to be viewed almost
exclusively as a constitutional right of decision-making or “choice.”8 Under the
Supreme Court’s current analysis, the abortion right is cabined exclusively as a
constitutional right to decide to terminate a pregnancy and the Court has upheld
significant restrictions on access to abortion-related healthcare under the undue
burden analysis developed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.9 In marked contrast with the AID movement, there has recently been a
dramatic retraction in the social support, legal rights, and healthcare access of
women seeking abortion-related healthcare. Courts, legislatures, and public
discourse continue to narrowly identify reproductive rights almost exclusively as the
right of abortion articulated as an individual’s right of choice.10
Putting these two movements in sharp relief, I argue that the current framing of
abortion rights more closely resembles the AID rights-framing of Dr. Kevorkian
than the contextualized healthcare framing of Dr. Quill. It is a critical time to study
and understand these movements as each is gaining significant momentum—again,
in opposite directions: In 2015, twenty-five states plus the District of Columbia
considered death with dignity legislation,11 and AID legislation was signed into law
in California12 with cases filed in California13 and New York.14 This term the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,15 a
Texas case on regulatory restrictions of abortion clinics.16 Further, more state
7

Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 387 (2013) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973)).
8
Id. at 387–88.
9
505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
10
See id. at 850–53.
11
Death with Dignity Around the US, DEATH WITH DIGNITY (July 10, 2015),
http://www.deathwithdignity.org/advocates/national [https://perma.cc/FW2N-TASX].
12
Governor Jerry Brown signed the End of Life Options Act into law in October 2015.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–444.12 (West, Westlaw through 2016
legislation).
13
Complaint, Odonnell v. California, No. 37-2015-00016404-CU-CR-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 15, 2015) (seeking to allow doctors to prescribe lethal medications to certain
patients who want to hasten death).
14
End of Life Choices New York filed a complaint in Meyer v. Schneiderman, Index
No. 151162/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 2015), to establish aid in dying in New York.
See also Anemona Hartocollis, Lawsuit Seeks to Legalize Doctor-Assisted Suicide for
Terminally Ill Patients in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/nyregion/lawsuit-seeks-to-legalize-doctor-assistedsuicide-for-terminally-ill-patients-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/W4DV-23AK].
15
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
16
See id. at 2300.
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abortion restrictions were passed between 2011 and 2013 than in the entire previous
decade.17
While previous scholarship has compared AID and the abortion right to
consider their doctrinal, moral, and ethical similarities,18 this Article is the first to
consider the extent to which these two movements trace opposing trajectories
between healthcare and rights framings. Comparing these two movements offers a
rich opportunity to draw upon their successes and failures to develop a new
healthcare frame which will situate both of these closely aligned rights in order to
achieve social justice goals beyond narrow constitutional rights status. Taken
17

More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011–2013 than in the Entire
Previous Decade, GUTTAMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/
2014/01/more-state-abortion-restrictions-were-enacted-2011-2013-entire-previous-decade
[https://perma.cc/LVG2-9T9Y]. See e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (applying the “undue
burden” standard, and thereby replacing the earlier strict scrutiny standard that had
previously been applied in cases involving restrictions on abortion); MELISSA MURRAY &
KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 775–76 (West 2015)
(describing that the undue burden standard replaced the earlier strict scrutiny standard and
was originally proposed by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). In the wake of Casey’s
lowered standard of review, there was a rapid increase in state-level regulation of abortion.
Id.
18
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 3 (1993) (discussing similarities between the
abortion and euthanasia issues); George J. Annas, The Promised End—Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Abortion, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) (arguing that “the constitutional
rights applicable to decision making about reproduction are not likely to be easily transposed
to decisions individuals make at or near the end of their lives.”); Susan Frelich Appleton,
Assisted Suicide and Reproductive Freedom: Exploring Some Connections, 76 WASH. U. L.
Q. 15, 15–16 (1998) (analyzing how the substantive due process protection articulated in
Glucksberg may be applied in future reproductive rights cases); Seth F. Kreimer, Does ProChoice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 803, 813 (1995) (considering the ethical and moral rationales underlying the abortion
and right to die cases such as the life at stake and the moral duty to preserve life); Sylvia A.
Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD.
L. REV. 292, 297–98 (1996) (analyzing whether there is a liberty or privacy right to physician
assisted suicide by comparing, inter alia, similar arguments made in context of the abortion
right); Philip Prygoski, Abortion and the Right to Die: Judicial Imposition of a Theory of
Life, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 68 (1992) (comparing how the judicial definition of “life”
changes between the abortion cases and the right-to-die cases); Robert A. Sedler, Abortion,
Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 529, 530 (1998) (comparing the legal, social and
political contexts in which the abortion right and the right to die issues were litigated and
their aftermath); Marc Spindelman, Are the Similarities Between a Woman’s Right to Choose
an Abortion and the Alleged Right to Assisted Suicide Really Compelling?, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 775, 775 (1996) (discussing the legal and cultural distinctions between abortion and
assisted suicide).
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together, the discursive development of these movements gesture toward the
potential gains of situating rights within a healthcare framing that considers how
social, political, and economic systems and relationships come to bear upon
decision-making. I conclude that while constitutional rights status is important for
anchoring a minimum protection of the right of patient decisional autonomy, a
healthcare-as-dignity frame brings with it the possibility of addressing underlying
conditions that deprive individuals of meaningful choice in these contexts.
The AID movement has been successful in seeking to address how AID
impacts those who are most vulnerable in society due to multiple forms of
oppression such as race, poverty, disability, and lack of healthcare access.19 As the
Supreme Court recognized in Washington v. Glucksberg,
The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose
autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of
access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a
stigmatized social group . . . If physician-assisted suicide were permitted,
many might resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial
burden of end-of-life health-care costs.20
The AID movement’s legislative and healthcare agenda transformed, from an
original focus on court-won rights, to a movement that addresses the challenges
faced by the most vulnerable in society, by increasing healthcare access, legal rights,
and social support for patients. For example, the AID movement has helped
transform the way doctors are trained in end-of-life care and palliative care, ensured
greater legal rights to patient control in end-of-life decision-making, and secured
near-universal availability of hospice care along with state subsidies to fund hospice
programs. By contrast, the abortion rights movement has been largely focused on
asserting and defending constitutional claims in court and less successful than AID
in addressing broader social justice goals such as the ways in which multiple forms
of oppression—including race, poverty, immigration status, disability, age, and
healthcare access—foreclose meaningful choice in the reproductive lives of women
more broadly, not simply in the context of abortion.
I argue that the history of the death with dignity movement highlights the
significant gains that can be achieved when constitutional rights of decision-making
are reframed as rights related to healthcare. First, identifying the right as healthcare
shifts the focus from decision-making to the conditions in which people make
healthcare decisions more generally. As a result, the movement has the opportunity
to garner support from opponents and to focus its energy on enhancing social
support, legal rights, and healthcare access. The shift away from the constitutional
right of decision-making offers the opportunity to consider how the social, legal, and
19

Those questions were put forth by opponents to AID as well as by Supreme Court
amici and justices at oral argument. See discussion infra Section II.A.iv.
20
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (citing New York Task Force
120).
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healthcare contexts in which decisions are made profoundly affect an individual’s
decision-making. Second, the trending success of AID suggests that courts and
legislatures are more willing to accept the claim of an individual’s decisional
autonomy within the context of healthcare than on ultimate questions of life and
death. This conclusion seems to be borne out by recent court decisions in both
Montana and New Mexico that upheld patients’ right to AID based upon the right
of patients to make healthcare decisions within the doctor-patient relationship rather
than on constitutional rights questions.21
At the same time, the history of abortion rights caution that while deferring to
decision-making within the context of a doctor-patient relationship may win
legislative and court victories in the short term, it raises the potential of creating an
incomplete right that is shared between doctors and patients.22 Narrowly identifying
a constitutional right of healthcare that conceptualizes the right as a relationship of
two—doctor and patient—runs the risk of subordinating the constitutional right of
bodily autonomy to the decision-making of doctors. Rather, the history of the
abortion right suggests that healthcare must be conceptualized as a broader framing
that considers how decision-making in these contexts takes place within a multitude
of relationships and social structures.
When seen together, these two movements offer the potential for broadening
our thinking about what reproductive rights and AID rights can look like in the
future. By moving beyond the narrow frame of individualized decision-making,
parties may be able to consider how social structures and institutions affect
meaningful choice in these contexts. Both movements have sought to move beyond
constitutional questions of choice—in the AID context as “death with dignity” and
in the reproductive rights arena in the reproductive justice framework. However, the
successes and failures of these two movements can inform a renewed vision of these
rights within the context of healthcare articulated as a right related to dignity that is
animated by social justice goals that enhance social support, legal rights, and
healthcare access. Just as the transition from Dr. Kevorkian to Dr. Quill represented
a change in focus from death to the process of dying, the death with dignity
movement offers the possibility of moving beyond a framing that centers abortion
to a broader movement that supports the reproductive choices of women and girls
more generally throughout the continuum of their reproductive lives.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by examining the legal and
political parallels between the two movements. Both evince a tension between
conceptualizing patient decision-making as a constitutional right versus a moral,
ethical, or healthcare decision. In addition, both have ignited fierce public debate
21

See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Mont. 2009); Morris v. Brandenberg, No.
D-202-CV 2012-2909 (N.M. Dist. 2014), appeal docketed, sub nom. Morris v. King, No.
33,360 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014); see infra notes 94–103 and accompanying text.
22
This is especially significant in the current healthcare landscape in which Catholicowned hospitals are increasingly consolidating to become the only healthcare providers
available in some communities. This raises the possibility that AID will be available only to
those with the means to find willing providers. See infra notes 187–188 and accompanying
text.
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and protracted legal battles driven by the same primary opponents. Next, Part I
considers how, despite these parallels, the two issues have been framed very
differently, alternatively as healthcare and constitutional rights. The early “right to
die” framing of Dr. Kevorkian identified AID as an individual’s constitutional right
of decision-making uncoupled from the realm of the doctor-patient relationship. In
contrast, this Article highlights how the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade identified
abortion as a right of decision-making that was shared between patients and their
physicians.
Part II describes how these two movements have traded places between
framings of rights and healthcare. On the one hand, the Supreme Court failed to
recognize a constitutional right of AID in Washington v. Glucksberg at the same
time that a legislative and healthcare reform movement was gaining traction in
passing laws to enhance the social support, legal rights, and healthcare practices for
the dying. Part II considers the ways in which the confluence of these two factors
served to recast AID from the Kevorkian-style framing of individual rights, to a
healthcare framing. It further examines how Dr. Quill’s call for “death with dignity”
explicitly resituated AID within the context of the doctor-patient relationship and
helped to provide the conceptual framework for AID’s transition to healthcare in a
way that was deeply reminiscent of the early abortion cases. Next, Part II describes
how abortion moved in the opposite direction. Specifically, in abortion cases,
women seeking abortion were reconceptualized by the Court from healthcare
consumers to rightsholders while at the same time their access to legal rights,
healthcare access, and social support were sharply curtailed.
Part III draws upon the two movements to develop the notion of dignity-related
healthcare. Part III begins with a discussion of the role of dignity as an animating
principle in the law generally, and how dignity has been invoked in AID cases
specifically. Next, this section explores how both dignity and healthcare are
concepts that have been threaded through the jurisprudence of abortion. Part III
argues that important lessons can be drawn from the AID movement’s legislative
and healthcare reform efforts that were aimed at addressing the ways in which AID
impacts those who are most vulnerable in society because of poverty, disability, and
lack of healthcare access. The AID movement transformed the process of dying by
seeking social justice goals rather than simply the constitutional right to make the
AID decision. Part III concludes that the lesson to be drawn from the death with
dignity movement is this: Healthcare must be reframed from an individual’s right to
make the decision, to a fundamental shift in the way death is perceived, supported,
and addressed in the healthcare system in response to patient vulnerability. Part III
concludes that dignity-related healthcare should address how decision-making in
these contexts—both AID and reproductive health—occurs within a systemic set of
values, social, economic, and governmental structures. Part III argues that a similar
shift is possible—and necessary, in the context of reproductive rights—from a focus
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on abortion decision-making to a broader framing of reproductive healthcare, rights,
and justice.23
There is not a clear symmetry with respect to the ethical and legal tensions
presented by these two issues. Indeed, much scholarship has compared their moral
and ethical tensions—such as how to conceptualize the life at stake and the moral
duty to preserve life,24 and considering how the definition of “life” changes in these
two contexts.25 Further, much scholarship has compared the legal issues presented
by abortion and AID—such as whether there is a fundamental “right to life” that
animates both,26 whether the constitutional rights applicable to decision-making
about reproduction can be transposed to decisions individuals make at or near the
end of their lives,27 and comparing the liberty and privacy rights presented by these
cases.28 This Article looks instead at how these two issues have transitioned over

23

Scholarship and advocacy in reproductive justice offer a potential framework for
achieving these goals. Reproductive justice seeks to support the rights of all women and girls
to have meaningful reproductive choice, including the right to have children, the right not to
have children, and the right to parent children. Reproductive justice envisions reproductive
access and healthcare beyond narrow framings of constitutional rights with that goal of
enhancing
the social, financial, political, and legal conditions required to make genuine
choices about reproduction—choices that must be respected, supported, and
treated with dignity. We are particularly concerned about advancing the position
of marginalized populations whose reproduction has been forced, denied, or
exploited. The rights to have children, not to have children, and to parent children
are of an intimate, fundamental nature and ought to be accessible to all.
See UC REGENTS, UC BERKLEY SCHOOL OF LAW, Center on Reproductive Rights and
Justice, (2016), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14379.htm [https://perma.cc/YL6M-4LKC];
see discussion infra Section III.D.
24
Kreimer, supra note 18, at 813 (considering the ethical and moral rationales
underlying the abortion and right to die cases such as the life at stake and the moral duty to
preserve life).
25
Prygoski, supra note 18, at 68 (discussing the judicial definition of “life” in abortion
cases and right-to-die cases).
26
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 3–9 (exploring whether there is a fundamental
“right to life” argument for both the abortion and euthanasia issues).
27
Annas, supra note 18, at 183 (arguing that “the constitutional rights applicable to
decision making about reproduction are not likely to be easily transposed to decisions
individuals make at or near the end of their lives.”).
28
See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 18, at 15–16 (providing that substantive due process
protection articulated in Glucksberg may be applied in future reproductive rights cases);
Law, supra note 18, at 297 (analyzing whether there is a liberty or privacy right to physician
assisted suicide by looking at similar arguments made in context of the abortion right);
Sedler, supra note 18, at 530 (comparing the legal, social and political contexts in which the
abortion right and the right to die issues were litigated and their aftermath); Spindelman,
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time in opposite directions between framings of healthcare and constitutional rights.
This Article uses this comparison to draw conclusions about how we should think
about healthcare more broadly with respect to patient dignity and social support,
legal rights, and healthcare access. My purpose is not to argue the similarity of the
issues themselves, but rather to examine the ways in which their similarities offer
important lessons to be applied both in the context of reproductive rights and
healthcare and to future development of death with dignity.29
I. THE EARLY FRAMING OF THE TWO MOVEMENTS
The Terri Schiavo case, which saw intense and divisive judicial and political
battles, exemplifies the many legal and political parallels between the death with
dignity and reproductive rights movements. Between 1998, when Michael Schiavo
first petitioned the court to withdraw his wife’s hydration and feeding tubes, and
2005 when his request was granted, the circuit court judge issued almost thirty
separate rulings.30 And more than thirty judges at the county, district, state, and
federal judicial levels heard appeals of the case. Conservative organizations
including Randall Terry’s Operation Rescue, Roman Catholic bishops and cardinals
in the United States, and even Pope John Paul II weighed in on the controversy.31
Conservative and religious organizations sought to closely align the Schiavo case
and the right-to-die issue with the ideological agenda of the right-to-life
movement.32 U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, stated that “[t]he
torrent of accusations reflects the bitterness over the life-and-death issues in the
Schiavo case . . . [these accusations] were a proxy on both sides for what provokes
every ugly political conversation—that’s abortion.”33 The Schiavo case still holds
supra note 18, at 775 (examining the legal and cultural distinctions between abortion and
assisted suicide).
29
While this Article seeks to identify lessons that can be drawn from the AID
movement’s success by drawing parallels to the many ways in which the two movements are
similar, it must be acknowledged that despite their many similarities there are some
significant differences between the abortion right and AID. First, the arguments for life in
the abortion context relate to the fetus rather than to the pregnant woman herself, as is the
case in AID. Further, only female-sexed persons have the potential to undergo the abortion
procedure whereas all people, regardless of sex, face the potential of a degrading and painful
end of life.
30
See, e.g., BALL, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that the judge on the case “would issue
almost thirty separate rulings and orders in the case” over the course of five years).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 52–53. A member of U.S. Senator Mel Martinez’s legal counsel stated in a
memo to his boss in 2005, “This [the Schiavo case] is an important moral issue and the prolife base will be excited that the Senate is debating this important issue.” Mike Allen, Counsel
to GOP Senator Wrote Memo on Schiavo, WASH. POST (April 7, 2005)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/06/AR2005040602042.
html [https://perma.cc/95T8-M686].
33
Allen, supra note 32.
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symbolic power: Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush ran a recent campaign
ad featuring a voice-over that he “fought time and again for the right to life,” over
an image of Schiavo in her hospital bed.34
There is significant overlap in the issues, controversy and conflict raised by the
AID and reproductive rights movements. First, they share a common legal
heritage—the legal foundation of AID cases explicitly rely upon Roe v. Wade35 and
its progeny when considering whether an individual has a right to make the decision
to terminate her or his life.36 Further, both evince a tension between conceptualizing
patient decision-making as a constitutional right versus a moral, ethical, and
healthcare decision. Finally, both have ignited fierce public debate and have
experienced protracted legal and political battles driven by the same primary
opponents. The Catholic Church and other pro-life groups see the ethical issues
presented by AID as deeply aligned with those of abortion.37 Those on the opposite
side of the issue concur. For example, the National Women’s Law Center drew an
explicit connection between these two movements in their support of California’s
aid-in-dying law stating that there is “tremendous opposition to certain care at the
end of life from the same forces that oppose women’s right to reproductive health
care. Because these two issues implicate similar interests of privacy, autonomy,
bodily integrity, and respect for the patient’s conscience and beliefs, we feel
compelled to support [the bill].”38
Despite their similarities, the two issues have experienced opposing legal
trajectories and currently have significantly different framing both in their treatment
in the law and in public perception. This Article argues that the dignity and
healthcare framing of the AID movement has been more successful in achieving
legislative, public policy, and court-won victories.
34

Adam Howard, Terri Schiavo’s Husband Calls Jeb Bush Ad ‘Disgusting,’ MSNBC
(January 27, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/terri-schiavos-husband-calls-jeb-bushad-disgusting?cid=sm_fb_msnbc [https://perma.cc/NBT3-LGHW]. Then-Governor Jeb
Bush has invoked Schiavo on the campaign trail, for example, telling attendees at the
conservative Faith and Freedom conference last June, “I stood on the side of Terri Schiavo.”
Id.
35
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 778–79 (1997) (“The analogies between
the abortion cases and this one are several. . . . There is, finally, one more reason for claiming
that a physician’s assistance here would fall within the accepted tradition of medical care in
our society, and the abortion cases are only the most obvious illustration of the further
point.”).
37
See BALL, supra note 2, at 52–53.
38
Memorandum from Judy Waxman, Vice President of Health, Nat’l Women’s Law
Ctr. to Members of the Cal. State Assembly (May 15, 2007). See Brief for the National
Women’s Health Network and Northwest Women’s Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858); Leslie Bender, A
Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN.
L. REV. 519, 533 (1992).
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A. The Constitutional Framing of the “Right to Die”
In the early movement for AID, the most vocal and recognizable champion of
the right to die was Dr. Kevorkian, a retired pathologist who publicly claimed to
have assisted in the deaths of more than one hundred individuals.39 He did not have
ongoing doctor-patient relationships with the people he helped to die; rather, Dr.
Kevorkian helped strangers in their quest to end their lives without any clinical
examination or discussion of treatment options.40 He advertised his services in
newspapers offering a dignified death to those who wished to end their lives.41
Rather than counseling patients, he offered an end to life at the request of the patient
and understood his role as offering a service to clients.42 Thus, unlike the abortion
right that was framed by the Court and by physicians as a right integrally related to
the doctor-patient relationship, the early right to die framing of Dr. Kevorkian was
articulated exclusively as a right of decision-making unrelated to the doctor-patient
relationship.
The early AID movement sought to establish a right to die through the courts
as a constitutionally protected choice based upon the liberty interest of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These early cases,
beginning in the 1970s, involved patients who lacked capacity to make the decision
to be removed from life support because they were in a permanent vegetative state
(PVS) or coma.43 In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re Quinlan,44
concluded that the life of a PVS patient could be ended by withdrawing life support
and based its holding on early privacy cases, especially Roe v. Wade.45 Echoing the
Roe decision, the court stated that “[p]resumably this [personal privacy] right is
broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a
39

BARRY ROSENFELD, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE INTERFACE OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND MEDICAL ETHICS 28 (2004); see BALL, supra note 2,
at 68.
40
BALL, supra note 2, at 68.
41
Howard Ball describes one such ad that ran in the Detroit Free Press that read,
“Death Counseling / is someone in your family terminally ill? / Does he or she wish to die—
and with dignity? / call physician consultant / ([Telephone Number]),” BALL, supra note 2,
at 71 (citations and quotations omitted).
42
After several unsuccessful attempts to prosecute Dr. Kevorkian in the mid-1990s, he
was convicted of second-degree murder in 1998 for an act of euthanasia that was taped and
televised. The euthanasia was televised on CBS’s 60 Minutes and involved administration of
a lethal injection to a 52-year old man suffering from ALS, also known as Lou Gehrig’s
Disease. BALL, supra note 2, at 72; ROSENFELD, supra note 39, at 28–29.
43
See, e.g., In Re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the vegetative
condition of Karen Quinlan); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
266 (1990) (detailing Nancy Cruzan’s PVS).
44
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
45
Id. at 663 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.”46 By 1990, the
Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health47 held that life
support can be withdrawn from an incompetent patient when there has been shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the PVS patient, when competent, indicated
verbally or by an advance directive, that he or she did not want to be kept alive by
machines in cases where there was no quality of life possible.48
In 1997, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg49 and its companion
case Vacco v. Quill,50 held that the statutes in New York and Washington that
prohibited assisting in a suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.51 The Court drew an explicit
connection with the abortion cases with respect to the role of the physician in the
exercise of the right as well as the need to examine the issue within the nation’s
history and values.52 Citing the seven-hundred-year history of legal precedents
supporting the prohibition of assisted suicide, the Court held that physician-assisted
suicide was not a fundamental right and was not deeply rooted in the nation’s history
and tradition.53 Further, the Court affirmed that the state had a legitimate interest in
the preservation of human life.54
The push to achieve court recognition of a constitutional right to AID took
place in the context of a larger social movement lead by lawyers, physicians,
ethicists, and religious leaders. Physician organizations pressed for changes in the
law around advanced healthcare directives and living wills, and physician groups

46

Echoing a similar rationale as found in Roe v. Wade, the Court balanced the state’s
interest “in the preservation and sanctity of human life” with the individual’s personal
privacy interest to terminate life support. The Court held that the “State’s interest [ ] weakens
and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s rights overcome
the State interest.” Id. at 663–65.
47
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
48
Nancy Cruzan entered a PVS after a car accident. She remained in this state for fourand-a-half years when her parents requested she be removed from feeding and hydration
tubes. The Court stated that both common law and the U.S. Constitution allow a competent
patient to instruct medical professionals to remove life support systems so that the patient
could die but that such a right was not a fundamental right and must be balanced against
competing state interests. See id. at 265, 282–83. The Michigan Supreme Court in 1990 noted
that a knowledgeable patient “may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment because the
treatment itself is a violation of bodily integrity.” People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 732
n.59 (Mich. 1994).
49
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
50
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
51
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797.
52
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711, 725.
53
Id. at 711, 735.
54
Id. at 728.
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campaigned in favor of ballot measures for physician-assisted suicide.55 At the same
time, grassroots organizations such as the Hemlock Society, actively engaged in
political mobilization and called for litigation to advance the cause of physicianassisted death. Many groups, including doctor organizations, lawyers, ethicists,
laypersons, and religious leaders engaged in the political process to reform medical
practices and to draft and sponsor AID legislation. As one scholar noted, the AID
movement transformed what had been exclusively a private issue of death into a
political movement in which “communication and negotiation occurred in public
forums between institutions, organizations, and professional movements rather than
in the seclusion of hospitals and courtrooms.”56
B. The Healthcare Framing of the Early Abortion Right
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade57 identified a constitutional right
of abortion and asserted that “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision”58 to be made in consultation with a “responsible
physician.”59 The Roe decision framed the healthcare interests present in the right of
abortion as encompassing the right of doctors to practice medicine according to their
professional judgment rather than recognizing abortion as a right of women’s health
that necessarily included access to abortion services.60 In describing the healthcare
interest of the abortion right, the Roe Court stated:
55

See DANIEL HILLYARD & JOHN DOMBRINK, DYING RIGHT: THE DEATH WITH
DIGNITY MOVEMENT 18–19 (2001).
56
Id. at 241.
57
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held that a Texas criminal abortion statute violated
women’s right of privacy encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty. Id. at 154.
58
Id. at 166.
59
Id. at 153.
60
As will be discussed in Section II.C. infra, this framing was widely criticized by
feminists who argued that the Court’s opinion that emphasized the rights of physicians,
necessarily compromised the full recognition of women’s constitutional right to abortion.
See also Elizabeth Reilly, “The Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the Supreme
Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J. L. & POL. 757, 774–
77 (1998). A Supreme Court clerk to Justice Lewis Powell, Junior, wrote a notation on an
early draft of the Roe opinion that read, “The abortion decision inherently is a medical one,
and the responsibility for that decision must rest with the physician.” Doesn’t it seem that
this language overstates the doctor’s role and undercuts the woman’s personal interest in the
decision? All medical decisions are the product of an agreement between patient and doctor.
I see no reason, therefore, not to add a clause to this sentence indicating that the abortion
decision must rest “with the physician and his patient.” Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme
Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 41, 41 (2008) (citing Memorandum from Larry A. Hammond of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 27, 1972) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Collection, Box 5, Washington & Lee University Law School Library)).
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The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where
important state interests provide compelling justifications for
intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for
it must rest with the physician.61
In considering the state’s interest in protecting health and maternal life, the Roe
Court asserted that “neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for
which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an
abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.”62 And again, “prior to this ‘compelling’
point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s
pregnancy should be terminated.”63 Thus, healthcare as it related to the abortion right
was narrowly identified by the Court as relating to the decision-making between
doctors and their patients. As discussed below, the Roe Court’s framing of the
abortion right as a decision shared between doctors and their pregnant patients was
widely criticized for subordinating women’s constitutional rights to the judgment of
their healthcare providers.64
Like the AID movement, the movement for reproductive rights sought court
recognition of a constitutional right against a backdrop of a grassroots movement
that articulated a broader vision of the interests involved. During the 1960s, the
arguments for abortion rights were framed from many different concerns, including
61

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973).
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
63
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
64
See discussion infra Section II.C. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–79 (1992) (discussing regulation of abortion in the Roe era); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the
Physician’s Role in “Private” Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 197–201
(1985) (describing the past role of the physician as the decision maker); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–200 (1992) (“The
idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society was less prominent in
the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise
of her physician’s medical judgment. The Roe decision might have been less of a storm center
had it honed in more precisely on the women’s equality dimension of the issue.” (citations
omitted)); Greenhouse, supra note 60, at 42 (providing a quote as an example of how
Supreme Court justices discussed abortion in their opinions); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 45 (1990) (arguing that the medical model, which
emphasized the role of doctors in the abortion decision, reinforced the traditional role of
women as dependent and not in control of their destiny). But see Sylvia Law, Abortion
Compromise—Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL L. REV. 921, 932–33 (1992) (offering
a critique of Tribe’s THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES).
62
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public health, environmental and population concerns, sexual liberation, and
feminist calls for repeal of laws criminalizing abortion as critical to women’s
equality.65 A growing number of organizations supported the abortion right to give
the poor access to a procedure that had been long available to women with means.66
Physician organizations sought clearer guidelines to protect physicians against
criminal liability, and feminists called for an outright repeal of laws criminalizing
abortion as a means of achieving women’s equality.67 Feminists called for repeal of
abortion laws and argued that the abortion decision should rest solely with the
woman.68 The demand for access to abortion was part of a larger conception of
women’s equality that included childcare, protections against rape, domestic
violence, equal employment, equal pay, and equal opportunity in the public sphere
of politics.69
Despite the many legal and political parallels between these two movements,
they differ in important ways. The early framing of AID was cast exclusively as the
constitutional right of individuals to make the decision to end their lives. As
personified by Dr. Kevorkian, AID was articulated as a constitutional claim entirely
outside of the clinical context. By contrast, abortion was identified by the Court70 as
a constitutional right that was inextricably related to the doctor-patient relationship:
“[the Roe] decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment.”71 The next section describes how,
as each developed over time, the two movements traded places with respect to
healthcare versus rights framing.

65

Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L. J. 2028, 2034 (2011).
66
See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical
Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 834 (1999).
67
See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 65, at 2034.
68
LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 35 (2010); KRISTIN
LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 92, 95 (1984); Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s
Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1880–86
(2010).
69
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1395–97 (2006).
70
It is important to note that this framing was set forth by the Supreme Court in Roe
and did not reflect the arguments being advanced by feminists in the women’s rights
movement. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s framing, activists argued that the abortion
decision should rest solely with the woman and was a constitutional right essential to “full
human dignity and personhood of women.” Siegel, supra note 68, at 1881. Rather, the Roe
Court’s opinion straddled the framing of the doctor-led abortion reform movement that
sought to clarify the rights of doctors to perform abortions and the women’s rights
movements call to establish the constitutional right of women to bodily autonomy. Id. at
1879–80.
71
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
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II. RIGHTS VS. HEALTHCARE: TRANSITIONS
A. From the “Right to Die” to “Death with Dignity”
The two movements transitioned over time to ultimately trade places with
respect to how each was framed as a right related to healthcare and a right related to
decision-making. In the case of AID, this came largely in response to the loss of
constitutional rights recognition in Washington v. Glucksberg, and in the abortion
context, the “choice” framing was in response to strong opposition from the
antichoice movement. The result is that in its present framing, abortion is cabined
exclusively as a constitutional right of decision-making that is uncoupled from the
healthcare context, and AID has been identified as a right of healthcare decisionmaking within the doctor-patient relationship.
1. Reframing Aid in Dying as Healthcare
In the mid-1990s, the right to die movement began a transition to a new vision
articulated as “death with dignity.”72 Dr. Quill became the leading figure in this shift
from Dr. Kevorkian’s physician-assisted suicide to a healthcare framing of death
with dignity.73 In his article “Death and Dignity,” Dr. Quill described assisting his
patient “Diane” to end her life after a long battle with acute leukemia.74 His article
stressed the central role of their relationship, the many discussions they had about
her treatment options over the course of their eight-year relationship, his assessment
that she was competent, not clinically depressed, and was fully informed about her
72

HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 3–4 (dividing the history of efforts to
legalize euthanasia in three phases: the voluntary euthanasia movement, the right to die
movement, and the death with dignity movement).
73
For a discussion of the history of changing terminology in the AID movement, see
David J. Garrow, The Right to Die: Death with Dignity in America, 68 MISS. L.J. 407, 407
(1998). In public opinion polling, public support for AID is much stronger when terms like
“dignity” and “compassion in dying” are employed as opposed to “mercy killing” and
“suicide.” Id. at 408–09. See Jane Meredith Adams, Assisted Suicide Gains in Propriety
Oregon Vote Confirms Years of Steadily Growing Public Support, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 9,
1997, at D3; William Claiborne, Doctor-Aided Suicide Is Backed in Poll, WASH. POST, July
30, 1998, at A3; Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?
The Public Perspective, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2658, 2658 (1992); Peter A. Singer et al.,
Public Opinion Regarding End-of-Life Decisions: Influence of Prognosis, Practice and
Process, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 1517, 1517 (1995); Gary Libow, Poll Finds Tentative,
Conditional Support for Assisted Suicide, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 12, 1998, at B5.
74
Quill, supra note 3, at 691–94. See TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY:
MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 13 (1994). Dr. Quill’s decision to call for a new
paradigm of end of life care through the narrative of a story in reminiscent of the role of
storytelling in feminist legal scholarship. See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of
Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 971–82 (1991) (examining the emergence of feminist
narrative scholarship as a distinctive form of critical legal discourse).
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treatment options.75 Dr. Quill eventually wrote Diane a prescription for sleeping
pills. Four months later Diane killed herself.76 Dr. Quill’s new paradigm of death
with dignity stressed the important role of the doctor-patient relationship in end-oflife decision-making.77 This framing stands in sharp contrast to the early right to die
framing espoused by Dr. Kevorkian who identified physician assisted suicide as a
service and a right rather than as medical care.
Dr. Quill’s call for death with dignity, in many ways echoes the early abortion
cases as to the important role of the doctor-patient relationship in end-of-life
decision making. Indeed, Dr. Quill’s description of the relationship with his patient
Diane and their ongoing conversation over the course of several years of treatment
that ultimately led to her decision to end her life, was deeply reminiscent of the
Court’s characterization of the role of doctors in the early abortion cases. For
example, in one early case, the Court described the role of the physician in the
abortion decision:
[the] conscientious physician[’s] . . . professional activity is concerned
with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the
concern of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone else, is
knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of human
frailty, so-called ‘error,’ and needs. The good physician . . . will have
sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient that probably are not
exceeded by those who participate in other areas of professional
counseling.78
At the same time that Dr. Quill asserted the role of the physician in the end-of-life
decision from the individualized choice of the Kevorkain “death machine,”
legislative and healthcare reform efforts sought to support patient decision-making
through enhanced social support, healthcare access, and legal rights that ensured
authentic decision-making for the most vulnerable in society.
The death with dignity movement sought to recast the perception of end-of-life
decision-making from a lonely desperate act of assisted “suicide,” to a more nuanced
view that end-of-life decisions are made after thoughtful discussion within the
context of a doctor-patient relationship.79 Unlike the early Kevorkian-style framing
75

Quill, supra note 3, at 691–94.
Id. at 693.
77
See, e.g., Timothy Quill, Physician Assisted Death: After the U.S. Supreme Court
Ruling, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 481, 484 (1998) (stating that “we often teach our
physicians, unfortunately, to treat the underlying disease . . . [Death with dignity] means
finding out who is this person, what do they still want to achieve, what are their goals. We
are going to try to give them as much choice and control as we can.”).
78
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196–97 (1973).
79
See Tucker, supra note 1, at 1595 (noting the important evolution in terminology
from “suicide” to describe the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill person to choose
death).
76
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of the right-to-die, the movement for physician-assisted death emphasized that the
decision to terminate life was made within the context of a doctor-patient
relationship to assess the patient’s mental state and offer different paths and
treatments before reaching the conclusion to end one’s life with the assistance of a
physician.80 The next section describes the successes of the AID movements that
flowed from and reinforced the close nexus between AID and the doctor-patient
relationship.
2. Legislating the Healthcare Frame
The AID movement’s success in reframing death with dignity from a focus on
rights to a focus on healthcare is reflected in legislative reform efforts. While most
state laws still prohibit a licensed physician from writing a prescription for a lethal
dose of medication to hasten the death of dying patients, beginning in 1990, nearly
two dozen states sought to pass AID legislation.81 Oregon became the first state to
pass a death-with-dignity law in 1994. Washington State passed a death-with-dignity
law in 2008, and death-with-dignity legislation was introduced this year in the
District of Columbia and at least twenty-three other states.82
California is the most recent state to pass AID legislation. Governor Brown
signed end-of-life legislation into law in October 2015.83 Significantly, the
California Medical Association (CMA) changed course after a twenty-eight year
opposition to medical aid in dying to take a neutral stance to California’s End of Life
Option Act.84 In so doing, CMA became the nation’s first state medical organization
to change position on the issue of AID.85 The importance of the healthcare frame is
evident in CMA president Dr. Luther Cobb’s statement about the bill,
80

BALL, supra note 2, at 73.
These states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland (2009),
Massachusetts (2010), Montana (2009), Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire (2010), New
Mexico (2010), New York (2010), Pennsylvania (2009), Oregon, Vermont, Washington and
Wisconsin, Wyoming (2009). See Living with Dying, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT’L CTR.,
(August 2011), http://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ [https://perma.cc/3745CWWS]; see also, Kevin O’Reilly, Oregon Still Stands Alone: Ten Years of Physician
Assisted Suicide, AM. MED. NEWS, (May 12, 2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/200
80512/profession/305129970/4/ [https://perma.cc/ER2P-YFJN] (discussing the Death with
Dignity Act in Oregon); Valerie Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Death,
OCTOBER 2005 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REPORT (2005), https://willamette.edu/law/pdf/pas/
2005-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CTC-6HFS] (providing updates on recent scholarship,
legislation, and cases dealing with Death with Dignity).
82
Id.
83
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation).
84
California Medical Association Removes Opposition to Physician Aid in Dying Bill,
CAL. MED. ASS’N, (May 20, 2015), http://www.cmanet.org/news/press-detail/?article=
california-medical-association-removes [https://perma.cc/B8YT-4G92].
85
Id.
81

798

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

The decision to participate in the End of Life Option Act is a very personal
one between a doctor and their patient, which is why CMA has removed
policy that outright objects to physicians aiding terminally ill patients in
end of life options. We believe it is up to the individual physician and their
patient to decide voluntarily whether the End of Life Option Act is
something in which they want to engage. Protecting that physician-patient
relationship is essential.86
The central focus on the doctor-patient relationship was again highlighted by
Senator Bill Manning, co-author of the legislation, who described how CMA was
actively involved throughout the bill’s legislative process.87
While early framing of the right to die used terms like “assisted suicide” and
“mercy killing,” death with dignity legislation uses terms such as physician-assisted
death in an attempt to recharacterize the issue within the context of dignity and
compassionate choice. For example, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODDA),88
specifically provided that physician-assisted death “shall not, for any purpose,
constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law.”89 In
response to the ODDA, the Oregon Department of Human Services announced that
it would no longer use the term “physician-assisted suicide” to describe terminally
ill patients who ask doctors to assist them in dying.90 Thus, the ODDA went beyond
the legal status of physician-assisted death to redefine the very language used to refer
to AID and thereby helped reshape the public perception of the act.
Similarly, Montana’s Terminally Ill Act—which protects physicians against
prosecution for withholding or withdrawing life support for terminally ill patients—
specifically prohibits referring to a patient’s death “a suicide or homicide” “for any
purpose.”91 It also charges the Montana Attorney General with creating a
“declaration registry” and conducting a statewide campaign to educate Montanans
about end-of-life decision-making.92 Medical experts,93 legal experts, and the
86

Id.
Id.
88
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.897 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
89
Id. § 127.880.
90
Charles Fiegl, Oregon Nixes Use of Term “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” AM. MED.
NEWS, (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.amednews.com/article/20061106/profession/3110699
52/7/ [https://perma.cc/CS69-66SE].
91
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205 (West 2015).
92
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
93
Position Statement, Am. Med. Women’s Ass’n, Aid in Dying (Sept. 9, 2009)
https://www.amwa-doc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Aid_in_Dying1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ED24-TQ4M] (recognizing that the American Medical Women’s
Association’s position statement, Aid in Dying, states, “The term ‘suicide’ is increasingly
recognized as inaccurate and inappropriate in this context and we reject that term. We adopt
the less emotionally charged, value-neutral, and accurate terms ‘Aid in Dying’ and
‘Physician Assisted Dying.’”); see also, Joseph B. Stratton, Physician Assistance with
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American Psychological Association94 have increasingly adopted this changed
terminology.
By changing the terminology of AID, the movement sought to recast the issue
in public perception. This change in terminology reflects a transition from
conceptualizing AID as a “violent, lonely, despairing act” to the idea that “choice in
dying is more than an individual need, private crisis, or hospital staff problem,”95
rather it is a collective issue. As one commentator described it,
the word ‘suicide’ is well suited to the description of a distraught
individual with his whole life ahead of him [who] . . . commits a
completely senseless and utterly tragic act. In contrast, ‘suicide’ is not
well suited to describe . . . [a terminally ill patient] who . . . simply wishes
to avoid more needless suffering and indignity.”96
The transformation from the right to die to death with dignity was more than an
evolution of terminology, it was an important shift in public understanding of the
nature of the right itself and acknowledged the underlying questions of dignity,
compassion and autonomy that motivated the movement and the law.
3. The Healthcare Frame Reflected in Court Opinions
The AID healthcare framing is gaining traction in courts where the
constitutional rights arguments have failed. While three states—Oregon, California
and Washington—have legalized AID, Montana has held that a physician who
provides a patient with lethal medications cannot be prosecuted for aiding a
suicide.97
Dying: Reframing the Debate; Restricting Access, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 475,
475 (2006) (asserting that “the process of permitting people to actively end their lives before
their disease ends their lives” should be referred to as “physician assistance with dying”
rather than “physician-assisted suicide”); Position Statement, Am. Acad. Of Hospice &
Palliative
Med.,
Physician-Assisted
Death
(Feb.
14,
2007),
http://www.aahpm.org/position/suicide.html [https://perma.cc/47T6-M42A] (rejecting the
term physician-assisted suicide as emotionally charged and inaccurate); Judith R. Gordon,
New WSPA Policy on Value-Neutral Language Regarding End-of-Life Choices, WASH. ST.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, Jan. 8, 2007.
94
Rhea K. Farberman, Terminal Illness and Hastened Death Requests: The Important
Role of the Mental Health Professional, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL: RESEARCH & PRAC. 544 (1997)
(stating that The American Psychological Association has recognized that “the reasoning on
which a terminally ill person . . . bases a decision to end his or her life is fundamentally
different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses to justify suicide.”).
95
HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 241.
96
James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L.
REV. 309, 314–15 (2004).
97
Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009).
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The Montana Supreme Court in Baxter v. Montana considered a challenge to
the application of Montana’s homicide statutes to physicians who provide aid in
dying to mentally competent, terminally ill patients.98 The court specifically
declined to consider the question of whether a competent, terminally ill person has
a constitutional right to die with dignity under the Montana Constitution.99 Instead,
the court addressed the issue of patient decision-making and held that the defense of
consent could shield a physician from homicide liability based on the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship. The court stated that “the act of a physician handing
medicine to a terminally ill patient, and the patient’s subsequent peaceful and private
act of taking the medicine, are not comparable to the violent, peace-breaching
conduct [of homicide.]”100 The decision omitted constitutional considerations and
focused exclusively on the issues of healthcare, the doctor-patient relationship, and
dignity in reaching its conclusion: “Each stage of the physician-patient interaction
is private, civil, and compassionate. The physician and terminally ill patient work
together to create a means by which the patient can be in control of his own
mortality.”101 The court stated “the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
indicates legislative respect for a patient’s autonomous right to decide if and how he
will receive medical treatment at the end of his life.”102 Legislative reform in the
Baxter case was important in shaping judicial analysis, beyond a constitutional rights
frame to the context of dignity, privacy, autonomy, and access to healthcare.103
4. Addressing Vulnerability through Enhanced Social Support, Legal Rights, and
Healthcare Access
The AID movement has been successful in transforming the way healthcare is
delivered to people at the end of life through a legislative and healthcare agenda that
was responsive to critics’ arguments that the availability of AID would
disproportionately impact those who face multiple forms of oppression. As
described above, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg summed up this
opposition by describing that “[t]he risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals
in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty,
98

Id.
Id. at 1214.
100
Id. at 1216.
101
Id. at 1217.
102
Id. at 1222.
103
A similar challenge worked its way through the courts in New Mexico. In 2014 a
New Mexico district court in Morris v. Brandenburg, held that sections of the New Mexico
Constitution protecting rights to liberty, safety and happiness protects the right of a physician
to administer aid in dying to a terminally ill mentally competent patient. No. D-202-CV
2012-02909 (N.M. Dist. 2014) (citing N. MEXICO CONST. art. II, § 4). The case was reversed
on appeal, Morris v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015), and was reversed
and remanded before the Supreme Court of New Mexico, Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d
836, 857 (2016).
99
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lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized
social group.”104 The Court went on to further echo the position of organized
opposition to AID, stating, “If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many
might resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-oflife health-care costs.”105
The Roman Catholic Church’s argument against AID also addresses the social
conditions that affected the choice of terminally ill patients. A daily fact sheet issued
to supply talking points to priests and parishioners to lobby their legislators against
AID stressed that “[l]egalizing physician-assisted suicide . . . puts incredible
pressure on [the terminally ill] to ‘choose to die’—especially those who are
uninsured, ill, disabled, old or poor.”106 As one writer for Christianity Today argued,
Instead of seeking legal protection for euthanasia, we would do better as
a society to develop our present resources. The hospice movement, for
example, needs volunteers, money, and facilities to provide a less costly
and more caring context for dying. And there is room for better use of our
present knowledge for managing and eliminating pain. If we put our
energies into these approaches, we may discover once again that we are
all connected and that agony can have meaning.107
The AID movement responded to these concerns by pursuing a legislative and
healthcare agenda that sought to address the conditions in which end of life decisions
are made with respect to healthcare access, dignity, compassion, and autonomy. This
section details some of the legislative and healthcare reform successes of the AID
movement that address patient vulnerability. Each of these reforms seeks to alleviate
the underlying healthcare and social causes that may lead an individual to choose
AID, including pain, suffering, loss of dignity, lack of social support, and lack of
healthcare access.
The death with dignity movement pushed for significant changes in the way
physicians are trained to care for the dying, and the way healthcare is delivered to
patients at the end of life.108 In 1961, physicians received no training in treating
104

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (citing N.Y. STATE TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994)).
105
Id.
106
California Catholic Conference (CCC), “No on AB 374: California Compassionate
Choices Act,” www.cacatholic.org (the CCC was one of the major organizations that opposed
California’s Compassionate Choices Act, AB 374, and published daily fact sheets for Roman
Catholic priests and parishioners who were encouraged to use these fact sheets as talking
points to lobby their legislators).
107
David Neff, The Wrong Way to Go, 35 CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 28, 1991, at 15.
108
Palliative care is intended to reduce the severity of pain caused by illness, but not to
cure the illness. Hospice is palliative care for terminally ill patients and is provided at the
end stages of life. See BALL, supra note 2, at 106–07.
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patients facing death.109 For example, in that year the Journal of the American
Medical Association published a study of physicians’ practices in cancer and found
that 90% of the respondents preferred not to tell their patients of their diagnosis or
prognosis.110 By comparison, in 1997, the American Hospital Association reported
that 70% of deaths occurred after discussion to forgo or withdraw treatment.111
Sponsors of death with dignity legislation argued for changes in the law to rectify a
lack of medical school training for physicians in how to support a patient who is
dying.112 Studies have found that AID improves communication between physicians
and patients regarding end-of-life options.113
In addition, the AID movement pushed for significant changes in training
doctors in pain management in end-of life-care. Critics of AID, such as amici for the
medical and nursing associations in Glucksberg, called for improved palliative care
rather than AID, fearing that some would choose AID to end suffering, arguing that
“[AID] is not the right answer to the problem of inadequate care.”114 In 1999,
109

HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 16.
Id.; Donald Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 86, 86–94 (1961).
111
HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 17 (citation omitted).
112
One of the sponsors of ODDA, Dr. Peter Goodwin, along with his co-sponsor
Barbara Coombs Lee, argued in support of the law by drawing attention to the lack of medical
school training for physicians in assisting dying patients to die. Dr. Goodwin asserted that,
“Traditionally, patients were generally given very high doses of morphine and left to die. . .
. Physicians were trained that it is harmful to give the family the bad news until it is over.
These medical practices were deplorable.” HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 15
(quoting Dr. Peter Goodwin, physician and co-sponsor of the ODDA); Timothy E. Quill et
al., The Debate Over Physician-Assisted Suicide: Empirical Data and Convergent Views,
128 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 552, 552–58 (1998).
113
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that physicians working
with hospice-based palliative care providers in Oregon “are more comfortable with
discussing end-of-life issues with their patients since the 1997 enactment in Oregon of the
Death with Dignity Act, which focused attention in the state on end-of-life care and the
options available to individuals.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, GAO-08-66, END-OFLIFE CARE: KEY COMPONENTS PROVIDED BY PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES (2007) at 14
(examining key components of end-of-life care programs in Arizona, Florida, Oregon, and
Wisconsin). The GAO report found that the Death with Dignity Act had created an
environment where end-of-life issues were discussed more openly between doctors and
patients. See also, Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences
with End-of-Life Care Since Passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 285 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2363, 2368 (2001) (finding that physicians perceived that more patients found
conversations regarding the death with dignity to be helpful than upsetting, regardless of how
the physician felt about AID).
114
Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110). Additionally,
the briefs of surviving family members in Glucksberg argued in favor of AID, citing
inadequate palliative care and physicians who were reluctant to prescribe adequate pain relief
medication, care that resulted in “a slow, deteriorating death [that] often leads to loss of
110
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Congress passed the Pain Relief Promotion Act that codifies protection of physicians
for hastening a patient’s death as the result of pain management.115 Growing data
out of Oregon’s and Washington’s death with dignity acts suggests that AID leads
to enhanced pain management practices.116 These changes in healthcare practices
around pain management sought to enhance human dignity while at the same time
to ensure patients make authentic choices about end-of-life decisions, rather than
merely choosing AID to end pain.
The AID movement also sought to increase familial and social support of dying
patients in response to critics’ concerns that, as the Supreme Court described, the
most vulnerable might resort to AID “to spare their families the substantial financial
burden of end-of-life health-care costs.”117 The movement sought to increase social
and financial support of the dying process through developing a system of hospice
dignity and self-respect for the dying person.” Brief Amicus Curiae of Surviving Family
Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying, in Support of Respondents at 10,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858).
115
This issue is one that is being widely discussed among healthcare policymakers. For
example, an August 2010 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine called upon the
medical profession to change its “long-held paradigm that has limited access to palliative
care to patients who were predictably and clearly dying” to a new one which begins palliative
care at the time of diagnosis. Amy S. Kelley, Editorial, Palliative Care—A Shifting
Paradigm, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 781, 782 (2010); see also, Jennifer S. Termel et al., Early
Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 733, 733–42 (2010).
116
For example, a University of Wisconsin Study of pain management practices in
Oregon rated Oregon’s pain policy at a C+ in the years 2000–2003, and an A in the years
since 2008 after Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. CARBON CANCER CTR, UNIV. OF WIS.
SCH. OF MED. AND PUB. HEALTH, ACHIEVING BALANCE IN STATE PAIN POLICY: A PROGRESS
REPORT CARD 14 (2nd ed. 2006), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/Wisc.Edu.
PolicyReportCard2006_211447_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUK5-RSHD]; CARBON CANCER
CTR, UNIV. OF WIS. SCH. OF MED. AND PUB. HEALTH, ACHIEVING BALANCE IN STATE PAIN
POLICY: A PROGRESS REPORT CARD 19 (2014), http://acscan.org/content/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/PRC-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK5D-F3EN].
Another study in Oregon found that 76% of physicians reported that they took measures
to improve their knowledge of the use of pain medication for the terminally ill and 79% of
physicians reported that their confidence in prescribing pain medications had improved since
passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODDA). The Oregon study also found that
a third of physicians increased referrals to hospice following the availability of aid in dying
under the ODDA. Ganzini, supra note 113, at 2366. Another study found that since passage
of the ODDA, hospice nurses and social workers observed an increase in physicians’
knowledge of palliative care and an increase in physician’s willingness to refer patients to
hospice and to care for hospice patients. Elizabeth R. Goy et al., Oregon Hospice Nurses and
Social Workers’ Assessment of Physician Progress in Palliative Care Over the Past Five
Years, 1 PALLIATIVE & SUPPORTIVE CARE 215, 217 (2003).
117
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (citing New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is South: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Medical Context at 120 (May 1994)).
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care facilities. In 1974, there was just one palliative care hospice facility in America.
By 2010, there were nearly five thousand palliative care hospice programs available
in all fifty states. In less than forty years, medical treatment for the dying has moved
from a minimum number of patients treated in hospice to nearly 42% of all deaths
occurring in a hospice program.118 Hospice and palliative care is centered on a
philosophy that people facing end of life have the right to receive medical care,
emotional and spiritual support to die a pain-free and dignified death.119 Hospice
programs receive governmental funding in many states and are covered by
Medicare, Medicaid, and most private insurance programs.120
The death with dignity movement sought not only to change the medical
practices and social support for the dying, but also sought to pass laws to advance
the legal rights of people facing the end of life. The early legislative reform efforts
enacted advance directive statutes and Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) statutes
nationwide with the result that all but six states allow for some sort of living will
and DNR provisions.121
For example, while AID supporters in California were unable to pass AID
legislation because of well-funded opposition mounted by the Roman Catholic
Church, legislators focused instead on the underlying issues facing patients at the
end of life.122 In February 2008, legislators passed the California Right to Know
End-of-Life Options Act that did not mention physician assistance in dying but
rather, required that healthcare providers give terminally ill patients information and
counseling regarding end-of-life options such as hospice care, withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, and
“palliative sedation.”123 Similarly, despite defeat of AID legislation in Maine, in
2001 the Maine legislature passed two end-of-life care bills; one designed to
118

BALL, supra note 2, at 3. Hospice advocates, for example, have successfully changed
the way care is administered to people at the end of life. They assert that, “the last interval
before death can also be the culmination of the shaping of a human being, even as it
transforms everyone else involved.” MARIE DE HENNEZEL, INTIMATE DEATH: HOW THE
DYING TEACH US HOW TO LIVE xiv (Carol Brown Janeway trans., 1997); see also, IRA
BYOCK, DYING WELL: THE PROSPECT FOR GROWTH AT THE END OF LIFE 38 (1997). Amici
from the National Hospice Association argued for increased social and familial support in
the dying process through hospice care facilities, arguing that the final stage of life “may be
a time of profound opportunity for terminally-ill individuals and their families . . . . Given
proper support, dying can become an important, valued life event.” Brief for the National
Hospice Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 6–7, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656338.
119
Hospice Care, NHPCO.ORG, http://www.nhpco.org/about/hospice-care (last updated
Apr. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/AWG2-HXC4].
120
See infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
121
JAMES M. HOEFLER & BRIAN KAMOIE, DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE,
POLITICS AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 145 (1994).
122
Vollmar, supra note 81.
123
See Death with Dignity as an End-of-Life Option, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/449N-ZL4K].
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improve end-of-life care and the other to fund a Medicaid hospice benefit. The bills
not only established a Medicaid hospice benefit—funded at 23% above the Medicare
rate—it also mandated private insurance to cover hospice and increased the
threshold of care from six to twelve months, provided funding to hospice centers,
and funding to develop and implement a study of professional entry-level and
continuing education requirements related to end-of-life care for all licensed health
care professionals.124
Thus, despite the fact that bills failed to give patients the ultimate right to
choose AID, other bills passed that enhanced the quality of patient care throughout
the dying process by increasing healthcare access, social support, and better medical
training for doctors treating dying patients.
Death with dignity advocates undertook legislative and healthcare reform
efforts that addressed the underlying social conditions that affect decision-making
for people facing the end of life such as poverty, disability, and lack of social support
or access to healthcare.125 This shift in the way healthcare is provided to the dying
reflects a fundamental shift in the understanding of healthcare access itself, from a
narrow view of healthcare as a doctor-patient relationship of two people to an
enhanced notion of dignity-related healthcare that considers how broader issues of
social support, healthcare access, legal rights, and social structures enhanced
healthcare for the dying.
As described in the next section, while AID transitioned to the realm of
healthcare and the doctor-patient relationship, abortion moved in the opposite
direction. In abortion cases, women seeking abortion were reconceptualized by the
Court from healthcare consumers to individualized rightsholders while at the same
time their legal rights, healthcare access and social support were sharply curtailed.
Moreover, while there was robust debate in the AID movement that acknowledged
the impact of poverty, disability, and healthcare access on end-of-life decisionmaking, the reproductive rights experienced significantly less dynamic range, from
the early grassroots call for reproductive freedom as an aspect of women’s equality
to a narrow focus on “choice.”

124

Id.
Many of these issues had been raised by the amici curiae and the justices at oral
argument in Washington v. Glucksberg. In the Glucksberg and Vacco cases, a combined
forty-one amicus briefs were filed in opposition to the constitutional right of AID and
nineteen in support of the respondents. The large number of amici represented a wide array
of interests in the issue of AID from organizations representing disability rights, religious
organizations, medical organizations, hospice organizations, politicians, bioethicists, civil
rights groups, and in two cases, the families of the deceased in the two cases. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808 (1997).
125
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B. Abortion: From Healthcare to “Choice”
1. “Choice” Framing of the Abortion Right
Roe was decided against the backdrop of a robust grassroots feminist
movement that demanded reproductive rights as one aspect of a larger call for
women’s equality. Activists argued that the abortion right was essential to “full
human dignity and personhood of women.”126 However, in the years following Roe,
the expansive feminist call for abortion as an aspect of women’s equality began to
retract and narrow, emphasizing instead the constitutional basis of the right of
choice. Scholars have suggested various reasons for this. Professor Reva Siegel
described how in an effort to disentangle abortion from the contentious fight for the
Equal Rights Amendment, pro-choice advocates consciously chose to distance
abortion from the women’s rights claims that characterized the early abortion
movement.127 Others have argued that after Roe the grassroots political mobilization
that had been forged by a broader feminist agenda of equality was later forced to
narrow its message to a single “choice” issue in response to countermovement
pressure by the subsequent pro-life mobilization.128
Thus, while abortion began as one part of the broad-based feminist movement’s
call for women’s equality, those broader aspirations narrowed over time to that of
choice.129 This trend foreclosed a more robust articulation of the right beyond
constitutional rights framing. While Roe v. Wade had the immediate impact of
allowing access to abortion for many women, in the long term the abortion rights
movement after Roe had less success in transitioning beyond the constitutional rights
126

Lindgren, supra note 7, at 392.
See Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 68, at 1901 (stating that, “with conservative
backlash burgeoning, feminists came to relay on privacy reasoning as a way to separate the
ERA from their support for abortion and gay rights, until the women’s movement abandoned
hope of the ERA’s ratification in the 1980s.”); Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 69,
at 1395.
128
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 70–72 (1991) (noting that by 1975, institutionalized
tactics in defense of legal abortion had become central to the pro-choice movement as these
organizations became formalized and professionalized); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376–
77 (suggesting that Roe undercut a grassroots legalization movement and invited backlash).
But see, Greenhouse & Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade, supra note 65; Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373, 431 (2007).
129
While some in the larger women’s movement tried to engage broader concerns such
as rights to contraceptives and child care, abortion was treated in practice as a single issue.
STAGGENBORG, supra note 128, at 107. The focus on abortion’s legal status, to the exclusion
of broader issues of reproductive rights and justice is highlighted by the fact that in 1980,
NARAL changed their mission statement from “keep abortion safe and legal” to simply
“keep abortion legal.” Id.
127
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paradigm to engage the broader feminist concerns that had animated the early
movement. To date, abortion continues to reside almost exclusively in the realm of
constitutional rights.130
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s early articulation of abortion through a
healthcare frame also began to recede.131 The Court’s transition away from abortion
as a right related to healthcare toward a right solely conceptualized as a choice first
appeared in a series of cases challenging restrictions on federal and state funding for
abortions for low-income women.132 In 1977, the majority in Maher v. Roe133 upheld
limits on public funding for abortions that were not medically necessary.134 The
Court explained that the
regulation places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant
woman’s path to an abortion . . . . The State may have made childbirth a
more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but
it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already
there. The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither
created nor in any way affected by the . . . regulation.135
The majority refused to acknowledge that funding restrictions on abortion affected
the right of access and instead framed the issue in terms of how the effect of funding
influenced a pregnant woman’s decision-making.136
Three years later in Harris v. McRae137 the majority upheld the Hyde
Amendment, which denied public funding for certain medically necessary
abortions.138 The majority described that the abortion right ‘“protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy’ . . . [and does not prevent the state] from making a ‘value
130
131

See infra Sections II.B.(i) & (ii); Lindgren, supra note 7.
See Lindgren, supra note 7, at 385 (providing analysis that serves as a basis for this

section).
132

See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding Hyde
Amendment’s restriction on the use of federal funds for medically necessary abortions under
Medicaid program); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (upholding limits on state funding
for non-therapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding
prohibitions on state funding for non-medically necessary abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (upholding a city’s refusal to provide publicly financed hospital
services for nontherapeutic abortions).
133
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
134
Id. at 480.
135
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
136
See id.
137
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
138
Id. at 326–27; see Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A Travesty of Justice: Revisiting
Harris v. McRae, 21 WM & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 5, 31 (2014).
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judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and . . . implement[ing] that judgment
by the allocation of public funds.’”139 In the Court’s analysis, abortion was a right to
choose to terminate a pregnancy and limits on access to healthcare that resulted from
funding restriction were characterized simply as the state expressing a preference
for childbirth.140 The majority characterized women seeking abortion as
rightsholders who were not harmed by the lack of funding for abortion healthcare
because their right of choice remained intact.
The dissent in these funding cases consistently pushed back and sought to
reassert abortion through the frame of healthcare. The dissent in Maher v. Roe, for
example, stated that “indigency makes access to competent licensed physicians not
merely ‘difficult’ but ‘impossible.’ As a practical matter, many indigent women will
feel they have no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the State will
pay for the associated medical services.”141 The Maher dissent highlighted that
choice and access to healthcare services are integrally linked and that the practical
effect of burdening an individual’s right of access to the means of effectuating choice
is in effect to unconstitutionally burden the choice itself.142
Similarly, in Beal v. Doe,143 which denied Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic
abortions, the dissent framed the funding issue specifically by asserting abortion as
healthcare:
[O]ur abortion cases compel the conclusion that elective abortions
constitute medically necessary treatment for the condition of
pregnancy . . . Pregnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring medical
services. Treatment for the condition may involve medical procedures for
its termination, or medical procedures to bring the pregnancy to term,
resulting in a live birth. ‘Abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the
sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy.’144
The dissent highlights the tension in the Court’s alternative views of the abortion
right between healthcare and decision-making. The dissent in Harris v. McRae
highlighted the fundamental distinction in the way the majority characterized the
nature of the right of abortion:

139

Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74) (second alternation in
original) (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 314–15; see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (“The State may have made childbirth
a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed
no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.”).
141
Maher, 432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142
See id. at 487.
143
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
144
Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
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the Court suggests that a withholding of funding imposes no real obstacle
to a woman deciding whether to exercise her constitutionally protected
procreative choice . . . [F]or a poor person attempting to exercise her
‘right’ to freedom of choice, . . . [the funding restrictions] have precisely
the same effect as an outright prohibition.145
Thus, for the dissent, not only was abortion recognized as an aspect of healthcare,
but the abortion right included access to abortion-related healthcare services. This
led to the conclusion that laws that restricted access also restricted the right itself.
The Courts continued to transition away from a healthcare frame of the abortion
right in its analysis in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.146 Relying upon the undue burden analysis first developed in Justice
O’Connor’s dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,147 the
Court’s analysis in Casey specifically separated the decisional right to choose
abortion from access to abortion-related healthcare, stating,
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike
at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.
Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.148
The opinion identified the decision to terminate a pregnancy as a liberty right that
was not related to one’s ability to “procure” an abortion. Under the Court’s analysis,
limits on the health care necessary for abortion were identified as merely having
“incidental effects” on the abortion right:
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they
are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to
choose.149
Again, the abortion right was cast in terms of decision-making, referring to abortion
as “the ultimate decision” and “the right to choose.” The Court’s reasoning sought
to limit abortion to a decisional right, unconnected from healthcare, to terminate a
145

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 347 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
147
462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
148
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (emphasis added).
149
Id. at 877.
146
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pregnancy. The Court asserted “the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy.”150
Finally, in Gonzales v. Carhart,151 the Court upheld for the first time an outright
ban on an abortion procedure known as intact D & E and also upheld for the first
time an abortion restriction that did not contain an exception for the health of the
woman.152 The Carhart Court isolated intact D & E from women’s healthcare by
omitting any discussion of the healthcare contexts in which pregnant women would
seek a second-trimester abortion despite briefing on this issue by amici curiae.153
This deliberate decision to omit the healthcare issues that gave rise to secondtrimester abortions furthered the fiction that such procedures were “choices” that
occurred in isolation of women’s health care. The Court dismissed the decision to
use the intact D & E by stating that “expectant mothers, and society as a whole [will
be better informed] of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a lateterm abortion.”154 This carefully chosen language ignored the medical necessity that
drove the decision to seek a second-trimester abortion and instead sought to present
women who underwent this procedure merely as rightsholders who “elected” the
procedure.
2. Retracting Legal Rights, Social Support, and Healthcare Access to Abortion
In contrast to AID, legal rights related to abortion have been retracting
dramatically in recent years. Indeed, more state abortion restrictions were enacted in
the years between 2011 and 2013 than in the entire previous decade combined.155
There have been many laws passed that diminish the legal rights of women and girls
to obtain abortion-related healthcare such as parental consent provisions for

150

Id. at 874 (emphasis added) (quoting Maher v. Roe 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977)).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
152
See id. at 167–68; cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921–22 (2000) (invalidating
an almost identical abortion restriction because it lacked an exception for the health of the
mother).
153
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146–67 (2007); cf. Brief for American
Medical Women’s Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, n. 10,
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-1382) (describing that the benefit of choosing the intact D
& E procedure was that it allowed these patients, “to see and hold the fetus, and mourn its
death.”).
154
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160.
155
GUTTAMACHER INST., supra note 17. In fact, more than one-quarter of the state
abortion restrictions since Roe v. Wade were enacted between 2011 and 2015. More Than
One-Quarter of the 1,074 State Abortion Restrictions Since Roe v. Wade Were Enacted
Between 2011 and 2015, GUTTAMACHER INST. (Jan. 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/
image/2016/more-one-quarter-1074-state-abortion-restrictions-roe-v-wade-were-enactedbetween-2011 [https://perma.cc/J3EE-8UZH].
151
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minors,156 restrictions on federal and state funding of abortion,157 as well as
regulations designed to restrict and discourage abortions such as twenty-four hour
waiting periods,158 prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions in public hospitals,159
requiring all post first-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals,160 and requiring
informed written consent before an abortion could be performed.161
While the AID movement has had many successes in changing the way doctors
are trained and improving medical practices around dying, abortion-related
healthcare has remained unchanged and has been restricted. For example, the
number of abortion providers is declining,162 abortion-related healthcare is delivered
primarily through stand-alone clinics,163 and abortion practice is taught in only a
handful of medical teaching programs.164 After 1973, the medical profession failed
to make a concerted effort to train doctors in abortion practice and to encourage
doctors to integrate abortion into ordinary practice.165 Rather, in the years since Roe,
abortion-related medical practice has been marginalized by the medical community
and has isolated providers in stand-alone clinics.166 As a result, over the last thirty
years, abortion training has been steadily disappearing from residency programs that
156

Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976)
(invalidating use of parental consent forms in the abortion context); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (holding parental consent provisions unconstitutional). But see Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (upholding
laws requiring minors to secure parental consent or judicial consent before obtaining an
abortion); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990)
(upholding laws making it a crime for a physician to perform an abortion without providing
timely notice to a minor’s parents).
157
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480–81 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut regulation
that provided financial assistance for childbirth but nor for abortions unless “medically
necessary”); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447–48 (1977) (holding that state accepting
Medicaid funding were not required to perform abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
326–27 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment that barred use of federal funds for
medically necessary abortions); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,
521–22 (1989) (upholding a ban on the use of public employees and facilities for nontherapeutic abortions).
158
But see City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 449–
51 (1983) (holding the twenty-four hour waiting period unconstitutional).
159
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (upholding the ban by the city of St. Louis
on non-therapeutic abortions in its municipal hospitals).
160
But see City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 (holding that the provision at issue
unreasonably infringes upon a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion).
161
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
162
Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES, (July 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortion-t.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/QBR9-GJR7].
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.

812

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

produce new doctors.167 A 1985 survey of obstetric and gynecology residency
programs found that 28% of them offered no training at all, half of the programs
made training available as an option, and only 23% included it routinely.168 In 1995,
the number of OB-GYN residencies offering abortion training fell 12%.169
Further, while the AID movement has transformed the end-of-life experience
for patients by changing the way doctors are trained, emphasizing palliative care,
and increasing hospice, there has been comparatively little change in the way
abortion care is delivered in the United States since Roe v. Wade. In the years
immediately following Roe, women health activists began to set up freestanding
abortion clinics which were seen as the quickest and most economical way to offer
low cost, medically safe abortion services to the largest number of women.170 At the
same time, after the Supreme Court decision in Roe, many hospitals, both public and
private, refused to perform abortions. By 1976, for example, the vast majority of
public and private hospitals had never performed an abortion.171 By 1985, only 17%
of public hospitals and 23% of private hospitals performed any abortions.172 As a
result, the majority of abortions are performed in stand-alone clinics—such as
Planned Parenthood—rather than in hospitals. In 1973, hospitals made up 80% of
the country’s abortion facilities and by 1996, 90% of abortions in the United States
were performed at clinics.173 By 1985, a dozen years after Roe, 82% of all U.S.
counties had no identified abortion service provider.174
AID’s transition to a healthcare frame was accompanied by changes in
healthcare practices around dying such as palliative care, hospice care, and increased
legal rights in medical decision-making. In addition, two courts have upheld the right
of AID based on protection of the doctor-patient relationship, rather than based on
constitutional claims. By contrast, the Supreme Court’s abortion opinions have
gradually narrowed the scope of the abortion right to a constitutional right of
decision-making. At the same time that the abortion right has been isolated as a
constitutional claim, abortion-related healthcare, social support, and legal rights
167

GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 194 (2d ed. 2008).
Philip D. Darney et al., Abortion Training in U.S. Obstetrics and Gynecology
Residency Programs, 19 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 158, 160 (1987).
169
Bazelon, supra note 162.
170
Garrow, supra note 66, at 838 (noting that abortion activists chose the model of the
free-standing clinic because it was the lowest-cost method for providing medically-safe
abortions to a large number of women, most of whom would not have been able to afford the
dramatically higher fees charged by hospitals).
171
ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 189–90.
172
Id. at 190.
173
Bazelon, supra note 162. This trend is changing with a new push by pro-choice
physicians to open residency and fellowship programs in contraception and abortion practice
in medical schools across the country in an effort to integrate abortion as a seamless part of
health care for women.
174
ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 193; Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Abortion Services
in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63, 63 (1987).
168
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remained unchanged or have been retracting. The next section suggests that while
identifying AID exclusively in the context of healthcare has resulted in successes in
courts and legislatures, the history of the abortion right offers a cautionary tale about
the limitations of framing AID within the context of the doctor-patient relationship.
C. Abortion’s Cautionary Tale: Healthcare and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The Supreme Court in the early abortion cases clearly identified the abortion
right as a decision shared between doctor and patient. To be sure, informed consent
litigation has largely replaced the degree of medical paternalism evident in the early
abortion cases.175 However, despite the evolution in patient rights and informed
consent, an inherent imbalance of power persists in the doctor-patient relationship.176
Indeed, the courts have identified the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary
relationship in recognition of the degree to which patients must trust in and rely upon
the doctor’s knowledge and judgment.177 Therefore it is still important to consider
the impact of framing rights, in abortion and AID, within the context of the doctorpatient relationship due to the unique nature of the relationship and the degree to
which both patients and courts defer to doctors in healthcare decision-making.178
175

See George J. Annas, The “Right to Die” in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan
and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 875, 876–77 (1996) (describing the
informed consent cases that brought about changes in the paternalistic model of the doctorpatient relationship).
176
Id. at 876.
177
Id.
178
Indeed, the important role of the doctor-patient relationship is evidenced by the
numerous state laws that require doctors treating patients seeking abortion-related healthcare
to read informed consent “scripts” designed to dissuade them from their abortion decision.
A report by the Guttmacher Institute indicates that as of 2006, seven states mandated that
doctors provide “negative and unscientific information about abortion and its implications,”
either by supplying doctors with a script or by requiring doctors to provide state-sponsored
brochures to patients seeking abortions. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash,
Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling
Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., 6, 11 (Fall 2006) (“[P]olicymakers and public health
officials frequently disregard the basic principles of informed consent in favor of furthering
a highly politicized antiabortion goal.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 940–41;
Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375–79, 375 n.112 (2008) (“Although couched in the
protective terms of informed consent, these statutes are unabashedly meant to transform the
embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting
mother.”). For discussions of the role of the doctor-patient relationship in the abortion
decision, see Nan Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical
Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 196 (2006) (tracing the Court’s deference to medical
authority in the abortion cases and arguing that, “the expansion and contraction of deference
to medicine in the abortion cases has been an epiphenomenon of ideological shifts.”); Peter
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Scholars have resoundingly criticized the Supreme Court’s early framing of the
abortion right as a decision shared between pregnant women and their doctors
because it subordinated women’s constitutional rights to the judgment of their
healthcare providers.179 As previously discussed, the Court identified the abortion
right as a qualified right to make the abortion decision within the context of the
doctor-patient relationship.180 For example, the Roe Court described the abortion
right as “the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his
professional judgment . . . [and] the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician.”181 The Court framed the right of abortion as the right of doctors to
practice medicine according to their professional judgment rather than recognizing
abortion as a right of women to access the healthcare necessary to terminate a
pregnancy. Professor Reva Siegel, for example, has argued that the decision in Roe
v. Wade straddled the women’s rights and the medical models of abortion rights, and
gave only “confused expression” to women as constitutional rightsholders.182 As a
result, the abortion decision gave greater protection to doctors’ rights to make
medical decisions than to women’s rights to control reproduction.183 The deference
to the judgment of doctors in abortion decision-making reinforced traditional notions

M. Ladwein, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The End of the Physician Veto
and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1847
(2008) (arguing that Carhart signals the end of the “physician’s veto,” defined to mean the
autonomy and judgment of physicians in the abortion context); Theodore W. Ruger, Health
Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L. J. 625, 640–42 (2007–08) (discussing the de-emphasis
of the doctor-patient relationship in a series of contexts, including abortion).
179
See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 64, at 197–201 (discussing the Court’s approach to
the constitutional questions raised by abortion cases); Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 1199–200
(citations omitted) (“The idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society
was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant
woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical judgment. The Roe decision might have
been less of a storm center had it . . . homed in more precisely on the women’s equality
dimension of the issue.”); Greenhouse, supra note 60, at 42 (discussing “Roe’s paternalistic
assumption” about doctors knowing what is best for their patients); Siegel, supra note 64, at
273–79 (providing an account of the Roe decision).
180
Appleton, supra note 64, at 197–98; LUKER, supra note 68, at 94–100; Siegel, supra
note 68, at 1879–80.
181
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 165–66 (1973).
182
Siegel, supra note 68, at 1897. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 273–79; Appleton, supra
note 64, at 197–201; Greenhouse, supra note 60, at 42. See also Jessie Hill, Reproductive
Rights as Healthcare Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 519 (2009) (describing that
international human rights norms and the constitutions of most other countries create
affirmative rights to health services and arguing for a similar human rights framing of
abortion as a healthcare right in the United States).
183
Appleton, supra note 64, at 200–03.
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of women as dependent on men rather than in control of her own destiny.184 As
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg noted, “The idea of the woman in control of her destiny
and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled
with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical
judgment.”185
Similarly, protecting the right of AID by identifying the right as a decision
between doctor and patient, as the Montana Supreme Court did in Baxter v.
Montana, raises the possibility of creating an incomplete right in which end-of-life
decision-making is a shared decision between doctors and patients, rather than one
that rests exclusively with the patient.186 As was experienced in the early days before
Roe v. Wade, this leaves patients vulnerable to finding cooperative doctors to access
the right to both abortion and AID. Further, patients seeking AID, like those seeking
abortion, will find it increasingly difficult to find willing doctors to assist them in
AID as Catholic-owned hospitals merge with or purchase nonsectarian hospitals
around the country.187 Both abortion and physician-assisted deaths are prohibited by
the directives that guide Catholic hospital protocol.188 As Catholic-owned hospitals
consolidate across the country, it raises the possibility that patients who live in the
communities served by these hospitals will not have access to AID.
Further, protecting AID within the confines of the doctor-patient relationship
favors those patients with health insurance and financial resources that allow them
to forge a relationship with a private family physician. By contrast, patients who are
poor or uninsured often lack the resources to receive ongoing healthcare from a
private family physician and often receive healthcare services from public
hospitals.189 In these contexts, patients facing the end of life are much less likely to
have formed the doctor-patient relationship necessary to exercise the AID decision
within the type of doctor-patient relationship described by the Montana case or by
Dr. Quill in his relationship with Diane.
184

See TRIBE, supra note 64, at 45 (arguing that the medical model, which emphasized
the role of doctors in the abortion decision, reinforced the traditional role of women as
dependent and not in control of their destiny).
185
Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 1199–200 (citations omitted).
186
See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009).
187
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES
FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 36 (5th ed. 2009).
188
See generally Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough:
When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 732–33 (2003) (discussing
the reproductive health services provided by Catholic hospitals); Lori R. Freedman et al.,
When There’s a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM.
J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1774, 1774 (2008) (describing medical practice guidelines for Catholicowned hospitals); Monica Sloboda, The High Cost of Merging with a Religiously-Controlled
Hospital, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 140, 155 (2013) (discussing access to reproductive
health services).
189
See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY
AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 9–10 (2011) (discussing the public hospital system and
reproductive justice).
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As AID moves into the legal territory of the early abortion case law that
protected the right as an aspect of the doctor-patient relationship, abortion’s history
should serve as a caution to the AID movement: continue to press for constitutional
rights recognition at the state level. While the development of the jurisprudence of
the abortion right has shown that identifying abortion solely as a constitutional right
is inadequate to protect the healthcare access necessary to effectuate that right, it
will provide, at a minimum, the legal protection necessary to anchor the right of AID
for individual patients.
Part III considers what lessons can be drawn from the AID movement’s
transformation from what is identified as the individual rights frame of Dr.
Kevorkian to the contextualized choice of Dr. Quill. Part III draws upon the two
movements to develop the notion of dignity-related healthcare. It begins with a
discussion of the role of dignity as an animating principle in the law generally and
how dignity has been invoked in AID cases specifically. Next, Part III explores how
both dignity and healthcare are concepts that have been threaded through the
jurisprudence of abortion, drawing upon the death with dignity movements to argue
that dignity-related healthcare addresses how decision-making in these contexts—
both AID and reproductive health—occurs within a systemic set of values, social,
economic, and governmental structures. The lesson to be drawn from the death with
dignity movements is that healthcare must be reframed from a decision between
doctors and patients to a fundamental shift in the way death is perceived, supported,
and addressed in the healthcare system in response to patient vulnerability. Part III
concludes that a similar shift, in the context of reproductive rights, would suggest a
shift from a focus on abortion decision-making to a broader framing of reproductive
healthcare, rights, and justice.
III. TOWARD DIGNITY-RELATED HEALTHCARE
A. The Jurisprudence of Dignity
Dignity is a theme that runs throughout United States jurisprudence.190 Applied
in the human rights context and constitutions of countries throughout the world,

190

See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES
1–9 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., Cornell Univ. Press 1992) (providing
commentary on the idea of human dignity). Indeed, The Federalist Papers urged adoption of
a Constitution in order to ensure the “liberty,” “dignity” and “happiness” of U.S. citizens.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, 3. See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that “the essential dignity and worth of every
human being [is] a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”); William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX.
L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (stating that the Constitution “is a sublime oration on the dignity of
man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of libertarian dignity protected through
law.”).
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dignity functions as normative value from which positive rights flow.191 In contrast,
the U.S. Constitution sets forth a system of negative rights, or the right to be free
from government interference.192 As a result, in the U.S. context of negative rights,
dignity functions as a norm that guides other constitutional rights.193 Many
commentators have highlighted how dignity is infused throughout the interpretation
of constitutional rights.194 It has been suggested that dignity is a value that animates
the moral foundations of all constitutional rights.195 Some commentators have
argued that the term dignity is so pervasive in constitutional law that the Supreme
Court has “changed the content of U.S. constitutional law to name dignity as a
distinct and core value.”196 Indeed, the central role of dignity in U.S. law has lead
some to argue for its inclusion as a foundational principle of law.197

191

See G.A. Res. 217(III), at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing, “[a]ll human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights.”). See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xvii (1980) (discussing human rights with
respect to human dignity); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 193–96 (2011) (discussing different conceptions of dignity);
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656 (2008) (recounting the development of human rights and dignity).
192
See Rao, supra note 191, at 187; see, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
122–34 (1969) (describing the origins and consequences of negative and positive rights).
193
See Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 71
(2011).
194
See id. at 81–82; Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 703, 758 (1980); see also Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme
Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006) (noting that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized human dignity as giving meaning to constitutional
rights, and advocating for the consistent recognition of the value in the application of existing
constitutional standards).
195
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–78 (1977); see also
Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June
11, 1992 (discussing, as one justification for free speech, the idea that speech is valuable
because it is essential in a just political society, for government to treat its adult members as
“responsible moral agents.”).
196
See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1941 (2003).
197
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (explaining that the U.S. Constitution embodies the
protection of abstract human values such as dignity); Goodman, supra note 194, at 789
(advocating that the Supreme Court should expressly recognize human dignity as underlying
certain constitutional rights); Maxine Eichner, Families, Human Dignity, and State Support
for Caretaking: Why the United States’ Failure to Ameliorate the Work-Family Conflict Is a
Dereliction of the Government’s Basic Responsibilities, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (2010)
(arguing that “the respect for human dignity [is] at the root of the United States’ liberal
democratic understanding of itself”); Murphy, supra note 194, at 758 (specifying that “[t]he
fundamental value that constitutionalism protects is human dignity.”); Resnik & Suk, supra
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Dignity is particularly well-suited to function as a guiding value in the context
of rights related to healthcare as it is most frequently invoked by the courts to
describe aspects of liberty, autonomy, and self-determination.198 While its meaning
is imprecise and often inconsistent,199 its most fundamental or basic premise requires
that dignity attaches to each individual by virtue of being human and relates to
human agency.200 Courts have interpreted dignity as the autonomy and liberty of the
individual to be free from interference in the most fundamental decisions.201 The
Supreme Court frequently uses the term in contexts that involve certain personal
choices that are so central to individual liberty and autonomy, including those
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs, as to be protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment.202 In light of the central role that dignity plays as a
guiding principle and normative background in U.S. law, it is an apt term for
purposes of setting forth a concept of healthcare that is grounded in autonomy and
respect for human dignity.
The term dignity appears in a wide variety of constitutional case law.203 For
example, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy,
note 196, at 1941 (arguing that the Supreme Court has “changed the content of United States
constitutional law to name dignity as a distinct and core value.”).
198
See Rao, supra note 191, at 207–17 (setting forth a taxonomy of dignity in Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
199
See, e.g., Zachary R. Calo, Human Dignity and Health Law: Personhood in Recent
Bioethical Debates, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 473, 473–74 (2012) (noting
that “human dignity is a notoriously malleable term for which there is no agreed upon
meaning.”); John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS.
L. REV. 655, 662 (noting that dignity is “admittedly [an] ethereal concept.”); Glensy, supra
note 193, at 67; Rao, supra note 191, at 201–208.
200
Immanuel Kant, for example, describes dignity in terms of human agency by stating
that, “autonomy is the ground of dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (James W. Ellington
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 3d ed. 1993).
201
See Berlin, supra note 192, at 122; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth
Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 1978) (1859) (discussing autonomy and liberty of
individuals).
202
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (“The fundamental
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs.”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)(“It is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–486 (1965) (“. . . a
‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.”).
203
See Glensy, supra note 193, at 71; Rao, supra note 191, at 193–96; see, e.g., Jordan
J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into
Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 158 (1984) (noting that between 1925 and 1982 the
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dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers
of the Government or those acting at their direction.”204 The Court has described
that, “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.”205 Dignity has been used by the Court to articulate values
underlying freedom from race and gender discrimination. For example, the Court
described that being excluded from jury service on the basis of gender injures
“personal dignity and . . . the individual’s right to participate in the political
process.”206 On race-based classifications, the Court stated “[o]ne of the principal
reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and
worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.”207
Dignity also featured prominently in the recent same sex marriage case,
Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Supreme Court held that under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the samesex may not be deprived of the right to marry.208 The majority opinion closed by
saying,
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a
marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.
As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies
a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men
and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that
they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment
for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness,
excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal
dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.209
Supreme Court used the term human dignity or its equivalent in 187 opinions); Goodman,
supra note 194, at 756 (declaring that from 1980 to 2000, the Supreme Court used equivalent
terms in 91 opinions).
204
Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989); see also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State.”).
205
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
206
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 83 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the potential for
injury to dignity “that inheres in or accompanies so many sex-based classifications.”).
207
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
208
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
209
Id. at 2608 (emphasis added). The opinion earlier asserted that “There is dignity in
the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make
such profound choices.” Id. at 2599. See also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal.
2008) (recognizing that preventing gay couples from entering into marriages fails to

820

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

Dignity has been used in a wide variety of cases ranging from Second Amendment
gun rights, to campaign finance, and the death penalty.210 Thus, dignity is a powerful
value at play, not only in individualized decision-making, but as a value that
animates the other rights related to treatment by the state and the community.
B. AID and Dignity-Related Healthcare
Dignity has long played a central role in the fields of healthcare and bioethics,
and has been especially prominent in questions of euthanasia and AID.211 For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked questions of dignity in cases
involving the right to refuse medical treatment for the terminally ill. In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health,212 Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring
opinion that requiring a competent adult to endure the procedures of being fed
artificially by means of a tube against her will “burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity,
and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.”213
In Baxter v. Montana, the Montana Supreme Court, upholding the right of AID,
invoked dignity as a central concern and phrased the issue as whether “competent,

recognize the dignity of gay couples), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 466 (Conn. 2008) (same).
210
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (addressing dignity in
the Second Amendment context); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010)
(discussing whether corporate finance restrictions limit the dignity of free expression);
Wellons v. Hall, 558 U.S. 220, 220 (2010) (per curiam) (stating that judicial proceedings
related to death penalty cases must be conducted with “dignity”).
211
Calo, supra note 199199, at 473–75 (noting that while dignity continues to maintain
a significant role within human rights, in bioethics human dignity has acquired particular
prominence). Many have written on the bioethics of dignity in the abortion and end-of-life
contexts. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKAYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 174 (2002) (explaining
how modern ethical controversies by biotechnology raise questions regarding human dignity
to groups of people such as the unborn, infants, the terminally ill, and the elderly); LEON R.
KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 251 (2002) (discussing the ethical
controversies surrounding the right to die); RAPHAEL COHEN–ALMAGOR, THE RIGHT TO DIE
WITH DIGNITY 17 (2001) (describing that the concept of dignity “refers to a worth or value
that flows from an inner source. It is not bestowed from the outside but rather is intrinsic to
the person.”); DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 238–38 (explaining that, “[a] true appreciation of
dignity argues decisively . . . for individual freedom, not coercion, for a regime of law and
attitude that encourages each of us to make mortal decisions for himself.”); 2 NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX TO THE
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 22–28 (1979).
212
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
213
Id. at 289.
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terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to die with dignity.”214 Justice
Wayne’s concurrence expanded upon the importance of dignity in AID when he
stated,
Society does not have the right to strip a mentally competent, incurably ill
individual of her inviolable human dignity when she seeks aid in dying
from her physician. Dignity is a fundamental component of humanness; it
is intrinsic to our species; it must be respected throughout life; and it must
be honored when one’s inevitable destiny is death from an incurable
illness.215
Moreover, his concurrence specifically relied upon the dignity interest expressed in
an earlier abortion opinion in which the Montana Supreme Court struck down a
statute prohibiting certified physician assistants from performing abortions. Quoting
that case, Justice Wayne described that “[r]espect for the dignity of each
individual . . . demands that people have for themselves the moral right and moral
responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and
value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general, answering to their
own consciences and convictions.”216
As occurred in the AID context, using the term dignity in conjunction with
healthcare similarly signals a shift in framing from rights of individualized decisionmaking to a concern with the impact of social, economic, and political structures on
autonomy, dignity, and self-determination more broadly. As described above, the
dignity frame transitioned AID from a rights frame to a healthcare frame. This shift
brought about an expanded view of AID that considered the impact on dignity when
external forces such as poverty, disability, lack of state support of family and
214

Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213–14 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 1233 (Nelson, J., concurring). Montana is one of a handful of states, including
Illinois and Louisiana, which enumerates dignity as a protected right in their constitution.
The Montana Constitution provides,
215

Individual Dignity: The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person . . .
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights
on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or
religious ideas.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2015 amendments).
216
Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1230 (Nelson, J., concurring) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 989
P.2d 364, 389 (Mont. 1999)). Dignity was also an important aspect of the New Mexico
district court opinion Morris v. Brandenburg. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV 201202909 (N.M. Dist. 2014), rev’d, Morris v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015),
aff’d 2016-NMSC-027 (2016). There, District Court Judge Nan Nash described that,
“patients who choose aid in dying typically choose to die at home, in familiar surroundings,
with loved ones present. These are peaceful, dignified deaths.” Id. at ¶ 30.
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healthcare, and healthcare training, deprive individuals of dignity in the context of
end-of-life decision-making. By employing the term dignity-related healthcare, this
Article seeks to engage similar discussions and concerns to consider how social,
political, and economic structures and relationships come to bear upon dignity in
many healthcare contexts, including abortion-related healthcare, a place where such
considerations have not commonly taken hold outside of the reproductive justice
framework.217
C. Abortion as a Right Related to Healthcare and Dignity
Establishing the abortion right as a right related to healthcare grounded in
dignity brings together disparate strands of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on
abortion rights.218 The language of dignity was first invoked by the Court in the
abortion context in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.219 The Court placed the case squarely within the tradition of liberty
cases related to individual decision-making.220 Writing for the majority, Justice
217

It is important to note again that while the impact of social, political and economic
systems on reproductive health and rights has not been part of mainstream discourse around
reproductive rights, this framework has been integral to the reproductive justice framework
for decades. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERT, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 7 (1997) (discussing
the interplay between race, social problems, and reproduction); JAEL SILLMAN ET AL.,
UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 11 (2004)
(“Women of color in the US negotiate their reproductive lives in a system that combines
various interlocking forms of oppression.”); ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUST., A
NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH,
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 1 (2005) http://www.apirh.org/down
load/ACRJ_A_New_Vision.pdf. [https://perma.cc/978K-VLVC] (discussing the levels on
which to effect change for reproductive justice).
218
See Rao, supra note 191, at 183; Victoria Barantesky, Abortion Dignity: The
Abortion Doctrine After Gonzales v. Carhart, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 123, 167–68 (2013);
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 169, 208–12
(2011); Glensy, supra note 193, at 91; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008) (arguing that
gender-paternalistic views of dignity underscore Gonzales v. Carhart based on harm to
women as mothers and contrasting with the dignity of decisional autonomy expressed by the
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and
Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15,
16 (2004).
219
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
220
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440, 454–55 (1972) (upholding the right of
unmarried couples to access contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–
86 (1965) (prohibiting the state from interfering with married couples’ right to use
contraceptives); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1923) (recognizing the right to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children).
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Blackmun stated that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s
decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman’s right to make that choice
freely is fundamental.”221
The notion of dignity runs through both Gonzales v. Carhart222 and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.223 In Casey the Supreme Court explicitly connected dignity to
autonomy in the abortion decision stating “[t]hese matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”224 Justice Stevens’ separate opinion also engaged notions of dignity
in support of the abortion right: “The authority to make such traumatic and yet
empowering decisions is an element of basic human dignity . . . a woman’s decision
to terminate her pregnancy is nothing less than a matter of conscience.”225 The
Supreme Court in Carhart specifically relies on human dignity as the basis of its
opinion to allow government restrictions on abortion. In upholding the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the Court reasoned that the ban “expresses respect
for the dignity of human life”226 and thereby “the State’s interest in respect for life
is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole . . . .”227 At the same
time, the Casey opinion relies on a rationale of dignity to prohibit governmental
interference in a woman’s decision whether to become a parent.228 Indeed, as
Professor Siegel argues, “[A] commitment to dignity structures the undue burden
test itself.”229
In addition, there have been gestures toward identifying abortion as a right of
healthcare as opposed to a fundamental right founded in marriage and procreation
case law. For example, in his concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton,230 Justice Douglas
argued that abortion was a right of health that was related to privacy, describing the
medical privacy right as “the right to care for one’s health and person and to seek
out a physician of one’s own choice.”231 His concurrence identified abortion
specifically as a right of privacy related to healthcare, rather than as a right of privacy
related to procreation, marriage and childrearing.232 He described this right of
healthcare by stating, “[t]he right to seek advice on one’s health and the right to
221

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
223
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see Siegel, supra note 218, at 1696.
224
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
225
Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157.
227
Id. at 160.
228
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
229
Siegel, supra note 218, at 1696.
230
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
231
Id. at 219.
232
Id. at 211.
222
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place reliance on the physician of one’s choice are basic to Fourteenth Amendment
values.”233 He argued in Doe that the term “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment
included, “the freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily
restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk or stroll or loaf.”234 This characterization
associated privacy with healthcare and protected women as rightsholders exercising
a choice to access this healthcare.
Further, Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey also identified abortion as a right of choice that
is related to healthcare, stating,
this Court has recognized the vital liberty interest of persons in refusing
unwanted medical treatment. Just as the Due Process Clause protects the
deeply personal decision of the individual to refuse medical treatment, it
also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain medical
treatment, including a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy.235
Thus, the tension between identifying abortion as a right related to healthcare versus
decision-making has threaded through the abortion decisions in much the same way
that these two conceptual frameworks have vied for dominance in AID. Once again,
it is this shift between framings of healthcare and choice in these two movements
that this Article seeks to examine, rather than the comparison between the ethical
and moral implications presented by abortion and AID.236
The AID movement’s trending successes suggests that there is a benefit to be
gained by pulling together these two strands of thinking on the abortion right to
identify abortion as a right of healthcare specifically anchored in dignity of pregnant
women. It is important to note that recently the dignity argument has been used
effectively by the antiabortion movement. For example, woman-protective abortion
legislation237 seeks to restrict abortion based on the assertion that abortion harms
women because women who have abortions will come to regret their decision and
will suffer psychological distress.238 This trend makes it ever more important for the
233

Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 213.
235
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in the original).
236
See supra Introduction.
237
The woman-protective anti-abortion legislation is based upon the premise that
abortion harms women. For example, the South Dakota legislature used this reasoning to
pass legislation banning abortion. See H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed
by voter referendum Nov. 7, 2006) (stating the act’s interest was “to fully protect the rights,
interests, and health of the pregnant mother . . . and the mother’s fundamental natural intrinsic
right to a relationship with her child”). See, Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 992 (2007).
238
See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
255, 261 (2011); Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion
234
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reproductive rights, health, and justice movements to reclaim this framing.
Opponents have used woman-protective antiabortion legislation to change the
terminology around the procedure. While traditional abortion laws refer to abortion
as the termination of pregnancy, the woman-protective model recasts abortion as the
termination of a relationship between a pregnant woman and her child.239 The
Supreme Court incorporated the woman-protective reasoning in Gonzales v.
Carhart, to argue that the decision to undergo a so-called partial birth abortion
harmed women by fundamentally breaking the bond between mother and child.240
This broader vision opens the possibility of finding common cause in
enhancing the rights and dignity of pregnant women more generally, to healthy
deliveries, to reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies, lowering the cost of
parenting and demanding greater support for caregiving.241 For example, fetal
personhood legislation has been defeated nationwide, even in those states that
consistently support abortion restrictions by reconnecting abortion to larger issues
of pregnancy care, contraception, fertility, and women’s health.242 As was the case
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y. 223, 225 (2009); REVA SIEGEL, The
Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective AntiAbortion
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1653 (2008).
239
The South Dakota legislature introduced a woman-protective anti-abortion bill in
2011 that identifies abortion as, “the decision of a pregnant mother considering termination
of her relationship with her child by an abortion.” See Siegel, supra note 237, at 992
(discussing South Dakota’s legislation). The bill followed an earlier bill passed in 2005 by
the South Dakota legislature based on the same woman-protective reasoning that, “by having
an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with regards to
that relationship will be terminated.” Id. (discussing HB 1166, 80th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(S.D. 2005) (codified in S.D.L.C. §34-23A-10.1). The bill was halted by preliminary
injunction, see Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
banc), and is currently on appeal in the Eighth Circuit, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. S.D. Dec 07,
2011) (NO. 09-3231, 09-3233, 09-3362)).
240
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007); see Chris Guthrie, Carhart,
Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 879 (2008)
(arguing that states will use the psychology of regret from the Carhart decision to justify
wide-ranging constraints on the abortion right generally); Robin Toner, Abortion Foes See
Validation for New Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A1 (arguing that the Court’s regret
analysis will “galvaniz[e] anti-abortion forces and set[] the stage for an intensifying battle
over new abortion restrictions in the states.”).
241
See, Lynn M. Paltrow, Towards a Real Culture of Life (March 12, 2007),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2007/03/14/towards-a-real-culture-of-life/ [https://perma.
cc/WR3K-X4U3]; Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: DeConstitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1427 (2009).
242
Professor Maya Manian has argued, the potential for success in this type of coalition
building can be seen in the successful defeat of fetal personhood statutes despite a landscape
of dramatic restrictions in abortion related healthcare nationwide. Reproductive rights
advocates in fetal personhood battles have successfully argued that fetal personhood would
impact women’s healthcare decision-making more broadly by subjecting pregnant women
to wide-ranging regulation from criminalizing behavior during pregnancy, restrictions in
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in AID, this recognition offers the opportunity for proponents of reproductive justice
to find common ground with opponents of abortion who nonetheless seek to support
issues that will decrease the likelihood of abortion, such as reducing poverty and
increasing governmental or private social support for parenting, increasing
healthcare access for women’s reproductive health, and passing legislation designed
to eradicate discrimination against pregnant and parenting women. Indeed, there is
much opportunity to find common ground in the social support of pregnancy,
working mothers, and families in the context of reproductive justice more generally
rather than solely in the context of the abortion debate.243 Instead, abortion continues
to be almost exclusively conceptualized within the framework of an individual right
of choice to terminate a pregnancy that occurs in isolation of these social forces.
Transitioning from a rights framing of abortion to a dignity and healthcare
framing requires contextualizing the experiences of women who have abortions,
who birth and raise children, and who decide not to have children, to demonstrate
that reproductive choice serves to enhance dignity, compassion, and healthcare in
the lives of women, their families, and their communities. Studying the AID debate
from the alternative framings of Dr. Kevorkian and Dr. Quill reveals how the AID
movement transformed the “right to die” into a new paradigm of thoughtful
decisions made within the context of healthcare, with social and legal support
designed to enhance dignity and compassion in the lives of the terminally ill and
their families. Reproductive decision-making should be reframed in a similar way.244
CONCLUSION
The death with dignity movement has successfully maneuvered from an early
right to die, framed by constitutional rights, to a broad redefinition of death with
dignity. This has transformed the way patients experience the dying process and the
women’s employment opportunities, and potentially granting spousal control over
healthcare-decision-making during pregnancy. Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s
Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 77
(2013).
243
See Paltrow, supra note 241; West, supra note 241, at 1426 (noting that a fair
amount of pro-life feminist scholarship is now focused on increasing public support for
parenting); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Should Bearing the Child Mean Bearing All the Cost? A
Catholic Perspective on the Sacrifice of Motherhood and the Common Good, 10 LOGOS 15,
17 (2007) (arguing for a combination of Catholic and feminist thought on support for child
raising); Jacqueline L. Salmon, Some Abortion Foes Shifting Focus from Ban to Reduction,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2008, at A1; MomsRising, http://www.momsrising.org (seeking to
organize both pro-choice and pro-life mothers around issues affecting parenting such as paid
maternity leave and publicly-funded childcare).
244
Professor Maya Manian has demonstrated how fetal personhood statutes across the
nation have been successfully defeated by reconnecting abortion to pregnancy care,
contraception, and women’s health and arguing that this reframing should be applied to resist
abortion restrictions more broadly. Manian, supra note 242, at 77.
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way doctors treat the dying.245 Fifty years ago, the vast majority of people faced the
end of life in hospital rooms under the care of doctors who had received no training
in end-of-life care, with 90% of doctors preferring not to tell terminal patients of
their prognosis.246 Today, palliative hospice care programs are available in all fifty
states,247 almost half of deaths occur in a hospice setting.248 Doctors are trained in
offering palliative care and patients have dramatically enhanced legal rights to make
healthcare decisions at the end of life. 249 The death with dignity movement has many
successes in transitioning its agenda from a focus on the right to die to one that
addresses the dignity of the terminally ill through enhancing healthcare access and
legal rights.
The abortion right has been comparatively less successful in moving from a
rightsframing to addressing the reproductive healthcare needs of women and girls,
especially those who face multiple forms of oppression. As a result of the cleave that
separates abortion-related healthcare from the mainstream medical care
establishment discussed above, the current framing of the abortion right is more
analogous to Dr. Kevorkian than to Dr. Quill. Abortion providers have been
relegated to the role of providing services in isolation of healthcare contextualized
in women’s reproductive lives. Abortion has been identified exclusively in terms of
constitutional rights, which conceptualizes abortion as a right to make the abortion
decision free of undue burdens of state interference but unsupported in any other
way. Public perception, state-level legislation, case law, and the lack of training of
doctors in medical school, all reinforce the narrative of abortion as a right of
decision-making rather than as an aspect of women’s healthcare. As a result, the
abortion right has been given minimal effective protection, with the right being
recognized so long as women’s decision-making has nominally been preserved.
The comparison with the death with dignity movement suggests ways of
thinking differently about reproductive rights. For example, how reproductive rights,
healthcare, and justice can transition from an abortion-centric constitutional rights
framing toward a broader framing that seeks to enhance the support, respect, and
dignity of choices made by pregnant and parenting people as well as those who

245

Professor Sylvia Law explains that this transformation in the rights of dying patients
tracks similar trends in the movement to reform child birth to shift decision-making from
doctors to patients to enhance a patients’ right to control the conditions of how they
experience birth and, in the case of AID, death. See Sylvia A. Law, Birth and Death: Doctor
Control vs. Patient Choice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1059–61 (1998).
246
HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 55, at 16.
247
DE HENNEZEN, supra note 118.
248
By 2010, nearly 42% of all deaths occurred in hospice care. HOEFLER & KAMOIE,
supra note 121.
249
Professor Sylvia Law has argued that the movement for patient-centered treatment
at the end of life, especially in the area of pain management, can learn much from the earlier
movement for patient-centered birth and control of reproduction. Law, supra note 245, at
1059–61.
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choose not to parent.250 By expanding its approach from the current focus on the
right of abortion to embrace a broader approach seeking to address underlying
conditions that effectively limit choice in this context—conditions such as poverty,
lack of healthcare access, race, age, disability, and immigration status, to name a
few—the movement could similarly broaden the scope of abortion from
individualized decision-making to contextualized choice. Further, this shift may
offer opportunities for recognizing other forms of justice beyond simply effective
access to abortion. And these areas are ones where opponents of abortion may find
common ground.
At the same time, the history of the abortion right cautions against narrowly
identifying the healthcare of AID as that which exists exclusively within the
boundaries of the doctor-patient relationship. While this version of the healthcare
frame may win legislative and court victories in the short term, it runs a serious risk
of eroding the decisional autonomy of patients in favor of the decision-making of
their doctors. The current language found in the opinion by the Montana Supreme
Court that asserts the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship in the context of AID,
is almost identical to the language employed by the Supreme Court in the early
abortion cases. While the healthcare framing was effective to gain support of
physician organizations in the fight for abortion rights and was integral to the Court’s
analysis, it ultimately subordinated the decision-making of pregnant women to the
authority of their doctors.
When the histories and discursive developments of these two movements are
seen together, the potential for developing a more robust right of abortion and AID
framed as healthcare and grounded in human dignity emerges. This
conceptualization of healthcare related to dignity recognizes that healthcare
practices and access, legal rights, and social support are integral aspects of
healthcare. Further, it broadens the field of view from a narrow focus on healthcare
as the doctor-patient relationship to a broader commitment to healthcare that ensures
that all people have the social, economic, and political power to exercise meaningful
autonomy in healthcare contexts. Finally, this renewed right of healthcare based on
dignity looks beyond decision-making that occurs at the threshold of the abortion
decision or death, to think more broadly about healthcare within the continuum of
people’s lives. The death with dignity movement reframed the issue of end-of-life
decision-making from a decision between doctors and patients, and recast it as a
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This framework is often referred to as reproductive justice. Specifically, the
movement for reproductive justice contextualizes decision-making to consider how lack of
social support, access to healthcare, poverty, race, disability, age and rural location, for
example, affect decision-making. For further description of “reproductive justice,” see the
Reproductive Justice Virtual Library at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/centers
/crrj/zotero/library.php. See Jael Silliman et al., The Political Context for Women of Color
Organizing, in UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE (2004); ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR
ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, AND
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2005); SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPROD. HEALTH
COLLECTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK (2007).
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fundamental shift in the way death is perceived, supported, and addressed in the
healthcare system. A similar shift is possible, and necessary, in the context of
abortion to a broader framing of reproductive healthcare, rights, and justice.

